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The Coherence Index

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A global look at the urgent transformation today's world demands

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The 2023 Indico Report

The Coherence Index, a global look at the urgent transformation today's world demands

Introduction

There is no time to waste. Global challenges such as climate change, growing inequality, and the emergence of policy proposals that cast doubts upon the framework of human rights for all, regardless of status or origin, are upon us. There is an urgent need for a political reaction deeply committed to multidimensional processes that seek to protect human dignity. These processes are necessarily multidimensional because the profound interdependence between geographies, populations, bodies, dimensions of development and policies can no longer be denied. This is especially true of the eco-dependence of all the social, economic, and political processes produced by human activity. And time is running short. If world production and consumption patterns continue unchecked, scientific studies predict that changes in terrestrial ecosystems, some already beyond repair, will seriously jeopardize the sustainability of life. Starting, as is always the case, with the lives of the most vulnerable.

Indico is a tool that seeks to transform policies based on the most common denominator shared by all: our total dependence on the environment and our fundamental interdependencies

We need new tools to transform the way we see and understand the world; tools that allow us to appreciate the consequences and impact that human actions and policies have in different parts of the world and on people's lives. Only then will we be able to demand policies coherent with human rights and the sustainability of life[1]. Fortunately, thanks to the global scientific community, we already have sufficient knowledge about the effects these impacts have on the planet and on people's living conditions. They serve as the basis for the Coherence Index (Indico), a tool to addresses the transformations required in today's society.

Some readers may want to start with chapter 5 of this report entitled *The tool*. It is a synopsis[2] of all the elements used to build the Coherence Index: the approaches which link the Coherence Index with human and sustainable development, human rights, feminism and a cosmopolitan view; four transitions which are formed from the information of 50 indicators that evaluate 13 different dimensions; and the planetary pressures index composed of 2 indicators.

[1] IPCC (2023). *Synthesis report of the IPCC sixth assessment report (AR6)*

[2] Download the Indico 2023 methodology document here for a complete, detailed understanding.

This comes to a total of 52 variables with which to analyse the status of 153 countries around the world using a policy coherence approach.

The results of Indico may seem disruptive to some people. Not surprisingly, we often feel that we live in dystopian times given that some of the ideas that have been accepted for decades appear to come up short in explaining what is truly happening, for example, with the notion of development and its link to the idea of economic growth which has been taken for granted for a long time. This has only been possible because we have turned a blind eye to the impact that this idea of development is having on ecosystems and on the structure of inequality and exclusion that expands and deepens year after year. Indico unveils today's world by revealing these relationships, even if it is a world somewhat more distressing and worrying than we are used to seeing.

Much of progress over history is due to the sharing of public and political action and when common interests are imposed. Indico is a tool that seeks to transform policies based on the most common denominator shared by all: our total dependence on the environment and our fundamental interdependencies. As social and political animals, the times demand a new shared reflective vision that helps us overcome outdated paradigms[3] and design new policies based on alternative models.

Chapter 2, entitled *Public policies to sustain life,* offers an analysis based on the results of the Coherence Index. For example, we argue against associating income with development basically because it fails to reflect the planetary pressures generated by countries with the highest income. This pressure not only affects those high-income countries but the entire planet and especially the most vulnerable territories and people. The public policy obligations are clear: we need to take decisive steps forward in building spaces and mechanisms of global governance from a cosmopolitan perspective that is not permanently undermined by national interests. Similarly, policy coherence provides guidelines to help reorient economic policy,

[3] See Chapter 1: The imperative paradigm shift

stressing the need to focus on transparency and progressive taxation. Indico also provides results to better understand the state and perspectives of the world's indispensable feminist transition insofar as it addresses women's rights and representation and seeks to include dimensions that account for gender gaps.

This report concludes with two chapters in the form of case studies. Chapter 3, entitled *Policy coherence as a strategy to transform relations between the European Union and Latin America*, addresses relations between the European Union (EU) and Latin America based on Indico data, and makes pertinent recommendations. Similarly, chapter 4, entitled *New cooperation based on policy coherence,* makes a series of policy recommendations with the intention of renewing international cooperation based on one of the analyses provided by the tool.

The findings of the report give rise to numerous possibilities for the reorientation of policies, a process which must urgently be accelerated

In short, the Coherence Index is a tool that encourages reflection, analysis and research, applied and committed to urgent transformation. Its findings give rise to numerous possibilities for the reorientation of policies, a process which must urgently be accelerated. Using the Indico is a learning process in and of itself, crucial to gaining a more realistic and better suited understanding of the world. Applying its results to policy can be the key to the transformations we need. As we said at the outset, there is no time to waste.

1.
The imperative paradigm shift

1.1. The urgency of understanding that the development paradigm is no longer valid and of finding something better.

For decades, all of us who work in the field of development policy have conceived and designed our efforts based on the rank order of countries in terms of development. Since 1990, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has published the yearly Human Development Index (HDI) which has served as the fundamental tool for assessing countries' development policies. We were making a huge mistake. For decades we have been misunderstanding and mis-measuring development and that has pushed us into an unsustainable and self-destructive model. The Coherence Index, a tool based on the policy coherence approach to sustainable development (PCSD), makes this easier to recognize and helps spark ideas to refocus our efforts to achieve development.

The 2030 Agenda explicitly refers to development as a multidimensional process in which, in addition to the social dimensions of well-being, the environment and policy also come into play. This is why this declaration comes with several environmental Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a specific SDG on inequality, an SDG on building sound political and judicial institutions and another SDG that seeks to foster partnerships among all those involved in promoting understanding of and achieving these multidimensional development processes. This is also the reason why since 2020 the UNDP has been developing a finely crafted index adjusted for planetary pressures, because linking it to the HDI reveals that the countries that had served as an example to follow, i.e. those with a very high HDI (score over 0.8), lose this ranking when the ecological impact of their policies is taken into account.

The results of the Coherence Index allow us to delve deeper into this paradigm shift on development. First, because the four transitions that make up Indico follow the principle stemming from this approach, i.e. to integrate this multidimensional vision of development into each and every policy. This includes the cosmopolitan dimension which, as explained in Chapter 5, forces us to look beyond national boundaries and consider the effects that public policies have beyond the territorial borders of the State where they are applied. Secondly, because the planetary impact and pressures index enables us to dig deeper into the contradictions of the current development model and provides us with ways to reorient and prioritize demands on public policies.

Graph 1.1. Human development index adjusted for planetary pressures.



Source: UNPD (2022).

A devilish correlation.

An analysis of the correlation between the two pillars on which the Coherence Index is built, transitions and the planetary pressures index[4], reveals the uncomfortable truth that has been haunting us for years: the environmental impact of human activity is destroying the very ecosystems that support life. There is abundant public information about how planetary cycles are becoming overwhelmed and the consequences which call for urgent action on the part of all countries and stakeholders to drastically reduce harmful emissions[5].

The index encourages us to analyse several essential elements more thoroughly and accurately to guide our action. The first conclusion that can be drawn from Graph 1.2 is that the countries that score highest in transitions, such us Canada or Ireland, are exerting greater ecological pressures. This downward curve represents a devilish correlation for all development actors insofar as it has been promoted for decades without considering ecological impacts until now that we are putting the very sustainability of life at risk. Considering the gravity of this scientific evidence, it should come as no surprise that the vast majority of development professionals now confirm that development must be sustainable. But it is one thing to make statements and quite another to effectively redirect development processes towards a framework based on sustainability. The Coherence Index offers some guidance in this regard.

[4] As explained in various parts of this report, "transitions" refers to the aggregate of the four transitions evaluated by the Coherence Index (democratic, feminist, socio-economic and ecological), while the planetary pressures index measures the impact and pressures that the countries evaluated have on the planet, its design being based on the HDI adjusted for planetary pressures. For further details, see chapter 5.

[5] IPCC (2023): https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf

Graph 1.2.

Correlation between the transitions and the planetary pressures index of the 2023 Coherence Index.



Note: Transitions refers to the aggregate of the four transitions evaluated by the Coherence Index (democratic, feminist, socio-economic and ecological). The planetary pressures index measures the ecological impact and pressures that countries exert on the planet. The score attributed to transitions ranges from 0 (worst score) to 100 (best score) and the planetary pressures index between 0 (highest pressures) and 1 (lowest pressures).The full names associated with country acronyms can be found in el Annex 2.

Source: own data.

Zoom Graph 1.2.



Shared but differentiated responsibilities.

The Coherence Index enables us to go beyond the limited impact of statements that indiscriminately appeal to all countries to take urgent action to reduce emissions and other forms of environmental impact. This is a global problem. The planet's ecosystems ignore all administrative or political boundaries requiring everyone's attention. But not all should be called upon to play the same role. The distribution of countries in Graph 1.2 shows which are primarily responsible for the problem. If we draw a horizontal line at 0,75[6] on the ecological impact axis (value corresponding to Portugal, Turkey, Argentina, Italy, and Oman), we observe that 96 of the 153 countries analysed (62.75%) score above that level. Hence, the remaining 57 countries, with values equal to or less than 0.75, conform the group putting the greatest pressures on the world's environment.

What are the traits of the group of countries most responsible for planetary pressures?

They are the most privileged countries in the standard UNDP (HDI) and World Bank (income level) rankings, North American and Western European countries being the most responsible (see Table 1.1). While only two high HDI countries (Paraguay and China), one middle HDI country (Botswana) and none of the 28 low HDI countries formed part of this group exerting the greatest ecological impact, 87.1% of the countries with a very high HDI score had a score below 0.75 on the Indico scale. According to income level, 95.8% of high-income countries (only two countries, Chile and Hungary, are slightly above 0.75), and 27.5% of high-middle-income countries are responsible for the greatest impacts. None of the 64 low-middle-income or low-income countries evaluated by the Indico scale had such a serious impact on planetary cycles.

By region, North America, Europe, and Central Asia stand out for exerting the greatest pressures. In the case of North America, the only two countries that make up the region, Canada and the United States, have values of approximately 0.40, indicating that they exert enormous planetary pressures.

[6] Approximate mean value of the planetary pressures scores of the 20 countries with very high HDI and low pressures.

In Europe and Central Asia, it is the western European countries that exert the greatest ecological pressures. Of the 46 countries in the region, 32 have values below 0.75. Of these, 24 are from EU-27 (only Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania have lower pressures and score above 0.75), three of the eight countries are currently EU candidates (Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey) and five more remain: three geographically European (United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland) and two Asian (Kazakhstan and Russia).

Table 1.1.

Number of countries exerting the greatest planetary pressures (< 0.75) by region, income level and HDI.

GEOGRAPHIC AREA	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES EXERTING THE HIGHEST PLANETARY PRESSURES (< 0.75)	TOTAL NUMBER OF COUNTRIES	PERCENTAGE
Sub-Saharan Africa	2	38	5,3%
North America	2	2	100,0%
Latin America and the Caribbean	5	25	20,0%
East Asia and Pacific	8	18	44,4%
Middle East and North Africa	8	18	44,4%
Europe and Central Asia	32	46	69,6%
South Asia	0	6	0,0%
INCOME LEVEL	**NUMBER OF COUNTRIES EXERTING THE HIGHEST PLANETARY PRESSURES (< 0.75)**	**TOTAL NUMBER OF COUNTRIES**	**PERCENTAGE**
High income	46	48	95,8%
Upper middle income	11	40	27,5%
Low middle income	0	42	0,0%
Low income	0	22	0,0%
Not classified	0	1	0,0%
HDI RANKING	**NUMBER OF COUNTRIES EXERTING THE HIGHEST PLANETARY PRESSURES (< 0.75)**	**TOTAL NUMBER OF COUNTRIES**	**PERCENTAGE**
Very high HDI	54	62	87,1%
High HDI	2	32	6,3%
Medium HDI	1	31	3,2%
Low HDI	0	28	0,0%

Source: own data.

Lastly, eight countries from the Middle East and North Africa and East Asia and Pacific regions are also included in this group. These include Israel and the emirates of the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Arab Emirates and Qatar), and China, Japan, Australia, and Singapore in the Asian region.

The Coherence Index allows us to easily identify the 57 countries in the world that share the greatest responsibility for exerting pressures on planetary cycles

In short, the Coherence Index allows us to easily identify the 57 countries in the world that share the greatest responsibility for exerting pressures on planetary cycles with devastating effects on the most vulnerable populations and territories which in turn are least responsible for environmental problems. This pressure is calling into question the very viability of future life on planet Earth and demands taking a very critical look at development theories based on the notion of unlimited growth and intensive consumption of energy and resources.

These 57 countries must take serious action to reduce planetary pressures and impact and are faced with a much greater task than the remaining 96 countries. This means that international agreements to reduce harmful emissions and other processes that intensively consume resources and overwhelm planetary cycles are crucial. It is important to mention that the key to these international agreements is firm commitment from the countries that exert the greatest impact and pressures, particularly the 57 countries with an impact score of 0.75 or less.

This does not mean that all 57 countries have the same degree of responsibility and must take the same action. Planetary impact and pressures scores offered by the Coherence Index also help establish important differences. But what would appear quite indisputable is that political action is urgently needed in this group of countries to reduce harmful emissions and the footprint associated with their consumption model. And this urgency, in turn, suggests that de-growth targets should be set to reduce these impacts. And that means reduced production and consumption. There is no time for other processes based on technological solutions that would be unable to reverse trends because, far from slowing consumption, they seek to increase it. But also because they depend on finite resources.

The empty quadrant: policy coherence urges us to explore new paradigms.

Ideally, and judging from the distribution of countries in Graph 1.2 which represents transition scores and the impact and pressures exerted on the planet, we can identify an "empty" quadrant as the one towards which we would like all countries to migrate. This is the quadrant encompassing values greater than 80/100 on the transitions axis and greater than 0.80/1 on the planetary impact and pressures axis. No country meets both criteria, which is why we define this ideal quadrant as "empty".

Although no country meets both criteria, there are nine countries that meet the first of them (transitions > 80): Denmark, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Sweden, New Zealand, Iceland, Germany, and Belgium. Put simply, these are the countries featuring the best conditions for living. Major population flows in recent years should come as no surprise as the objective of migrants is to live their lives in countries such as these, featuring more democratic guarantees, more recognized and effective rights for women, and more and better basic and social protection services.

Societies have not been able to improve living conditions without exerting planetary impact and pressures

Also, 85 countries have scores above 0.80 on the planetary impact and pressures axis. As explained above, most countries do not have a major impact or exert pressures on the planet. Of these 85 countries, only 30 score between 50 and 80 on the transitions axis which means that there is a large subset of countries (55) that are not responsible for any serious planetary impact and pressures, but which score below 50 on transitions, i.e. have issues regarding democracy, feminism, cosmopolitanism and ecological transition. These are countries where living conditions are far from ideal, i.e. the countries that come to mind when we think of poverty, conflict and serious problems of inequality.

These considerations, based on the combined data of the two axes, are useful in describing the main differences between countries. But hasty conclusions reached from a linear analysis of the two axes should not be drawn. For example, although

it appears logical, the belief that the 85 countries that have the least impact simply have to increase their transition scores to offer better opportunities and living conditions for their populations, or that the nine countries that offer the best conditions only have to reduce their harmful emissions and ecological footprint to make their way into the “empty” quadrant, is naive at best since that would overlook the host of relationships that exist between the two sets of dynamics.

At least historically, societies have not been able to improve living conditions without exerting planetary impact and pressures that often impacts other countries. Hence, the geopolitical dispute over access to resources and sources of energy and to other minerals that are vital to certain production processes remains a factor in the configuration of world power. It is not only a matter of which countries chose to leave a larger footprint and emit more harmful emissions, but also which ones can actually make this choice. This is either because they have exploited and continue to over-exploit resources in their territories, or because they seize land and other resources in other territories, be it by military force or by imposing commercial and political mechanisms that ensure their privileged access to these limited resources.

Indico, following the policy coherence approach, offers and demands a closer look into the interrelationships of development processes, for example between relative degrees of improvement in living conditions and planetary impact and pressures. This enables us to understand that the “empty” quadrant is neither static nor permanent. On the contrary, the planetary nature of overwhelmed cycles caused by impact and pressures indicates that climate change, in terms of biodiversity and desertification, occurs on a planetary scale. As the limits of these cycles are exceeded, irreversible effects are occurring and change how ecosystems on the Earth’s crust operate. Hence, impact and pressures scores must be viewed as both planetary and irreversible dynamics. This has two main consequences.

First, we cannot establish national sustainability thresholds or acceptable degrees of impact with the necessary rigour[7]. Such thresholds can only be planetary and, in this report, we have arbitrarily set the threshold at 0.80 to intuitively show that hypothetical quadrant that all countries should aspire towards. Many institutions have tried to set this threshold in different ways. One is the biocapacity indicator which is defined as the capacity of a specific biologically productive area to generate a regular supply of renewable resources and to absorb the waste resulting from their consumption. When the ecological footprint exceeds biocapacity, we speak of ecological deficit or the unsustainable use of resources. It is easy to understand that if biocapacity is established in accordance with the planet's biological capacity and several of its fundamental cycles have been depleted for years, we will have increasingly less biological capacity meaning that it will decrease over time. In other words, as countries increase their planetary impact and pressures, the "empty" quadrant becomes narrower. Such is the fundamental interrelationship that calls for a new paradigm able to universally satisfy our notion of dignity and quality of life.

The coherence approach makes fine distinctions and demystifies the preponderance of income in the definition of 'development'.

The first and main criticism has to do with one-dimensional views of development processes, especially those based on income, that for decades, due to the influence of neoclassical economics, have been integrated and established in the form of scores. The principle that the higher per capita income in a country, the higher and better living conditions prevail, has become an established and virtually uncontested truth. As a result, the main shared objective of states is still to implement policies that achieve and promote greater income for themselves and their citizens. Any other goal —whether to reduce emissions, gradually increase fiscal pressures, earmark more funds for international aid or better equip public health, education or social protection systems —will immediately be curtailed for the sake of profitability, i.e. economic growth.

[7] For example, in the previous section we set a threshold at 0.75 to help visualize the varying responsibilities of countries, while in this section we set 0.80 as a stricter requirement and guarantee to delimit a quadrant that best suits the biocapacity of the planet. The virtue of the Coherence Index is that it allows for differentiated and specific analyses based on different scores.

Ample time and concerted effort will be needed to modify and eventually banish this economistic, enslaving vision of economic growth from development processes as this is part and parcel of a fundamental political dispute. The Coherence Index urges us to broaden our field of vision as a vital first step in the process of admitting other ideas and narratives on development. As noted above, 95.8% of high-income countries are part of the group most responsible for planetary impact and pressures. These countries have this impact because they can, because historically they have had leverage over other countries. Not so distant colonial times are a good example of these lopsided power relations based mostly on the extraction of resources and the labour of people living on the periphery to develop the colonies' 'mother country'. Neoclassical economic thought, also a product of prevailing western and colonial thought, continues to maintain uneven power relations after decolonization, now through other mechanisms. Decolonization did not do away with colonial thinking or action. Colonization is not the same as colonialism, which refers to a power structure reproduced in frameworks of thought and in courses of political action, characterized by contempt, criminalization and subordination of others who are often characterized as inferior based on race, gender, or place of origin. What a concept as familiar as 'underdeveloped' does is use the theory of development to reproduce colonialism.

Let us turn to another very up to date example. In recent years we have witnessed the emergence of a group of countries now holding top positions in terms of influence and power in the international community. We are referring to the emirates of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain are now at the top of all income-based rankings. For years now they have had considerable influence in international diplomatic, cultural, and commercial relations, and acquired positions of financial power on the boards of multinational companies and in the main scenarios of cultural and symbolic influence in world society. They have also made a spectacular investment in construction and infrastructure in their territories, mostly to attract tourists and capital linked

to intercontinental flights and global cultural events. The Coherence Index shows us that this group of countries operates in a specific, original, and distinguishable manner vis-à-vis other countries. The spectacular performance of their financial capital investments is not the result of multidimensional thinking, where women's and workers' rights or the democratic conditions of their governing systems matter. Meanwhile, their multi-million-dollar investments are producing enormous planetary impact and pressures. Both issues can be clearly observed in their ranking on the comparative graph showing transitions and impacts (Graph 1.2). Israel, the United States of America, and Singapore find themselves in a similar position.

1.2. A few study and policy recommendations to build a different development paradigm together.

The Coherence Index paves the way for different possibilities to facilitate the work required to meet the challenge of paradigm change. The fact that we already have enough evidence to recognize that the development paradigm that has driven policy for the last seventy years has reached the end of its useful life does not mean that we have the scientific and political resources needed to design and operate a new alternative paradigm. But this realization does offer some paths and approaches that contribute to building alternative paradigms together.

Bear in mind that differences are the result of historic power struggles over resources, territories and communities.

The ranking of each country based on its policy coherence is the result of historical processes in which many factors, including power relations established between different countries and disputes over resources, territories and communities, come into play. In this connection, the Coherence Index rankings are only partly the result of the specific merits of certain government leaders. The coherence approach emphasizes the importance of publicising, measuring, and requiring accountability regarding the impact that policies have beyond national borders, thus

dismantling the narrative asserting that these policies are justified because they are strictly national issues.

Typically, as in Spain, cooperation policy frameworks need to be addressed in close connection with diplomacy and diplomatic aims. In this connection, a systematic review could be conducted on whether national interests abroad can continue to be established as in the past, i.e. as a way to gain influence and procure comparative advantages in access to political, commercial and other resources. Cooperation policy is not divorced from political conflicts as we are sometimes led to believe when the approach to such policy is linked to allegedly universal values. On the contrary, it is now necessary to shed light on the political nature of cooperation as it relates to disputes over resources, territories and communities. In the final analysis, these disputes are expressed in different countries' stances. A specific chapter would need to be written on economic diplomacy, an enormously influential factor in Spain's foreign relations and to which cooperation is no stranger. The promotion of Spain's international business abroad cannot be examined separately from an analysis of impacts on communities in different countries. Likewise, it is worth mentioning the important issue of border control interference as well as its impact on cooperation policy when Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds are involved in outsourcing border control and establishing a link between migration and development that uses cooperation subordinated to border policy interests.

The coherence approach emphasizes the importance of publicising, measuring, and requiring accountability regarding the impact that policies have beyond national borders

Putting the very idea of development on hold.

The crumbling of the paradigm of national development based on the pursuit of unlimited economic growth measured in monetary terms calls for, at the very least, a bit of epistemological and political humility. To the extent that planetary impact and pressures are historically inseparable from the degree of development achieved by the most advanced countries according to this paradigm, it is neither prudent

nor advisable to continue insisting. Doing so is tantamount to turning a blind eye to enormous risks for the sustainability of life in a time marked by the Anthropocene, now feeling the consequences that human action is having on changing ecosystems. We see how these ecosystems are affected by a host of phenomena on a planetary scale, and on a different timeline than political, social and economic processes. The need to incorporate this geological timeline into a new conception of development processes warrants a thorough examination of the set of relationships and interactions generated by human activity as a whole from a new perspective. There is no denying that we are in the midst of change of incalculable proportions and unpredictable scope in the world that we have built in recent decades, perhaps in the last two or three centuries. The transition from a sickly anthropocentric society to one characterized by new types of relationships with our ecosystems will be slow and arduous. And, if not done fairly and democratically, it will be dramatic.

This change will require many different pushes that will often be interpreted as unwelcome and even dangerous. The very idea of sustainable development arises from the need to qualify the prevailing theories of development in vogue in the mid-1980s. Forty years later, that idea continues to struggle to find its way out of well-intended statements and into the everyday reality of our societies, which continue to promote production and consumption that exacerbate pressures on the planet. Perhaps it is time to realize that the idea of sustainability should not be limited to simply nuancing the other stronger and more substantial idea of development. It may be time to start choosing either one or the other. At least between sustainability and those elements that more decisively and viciously threaten the stability of planetary cycles and, therefore, the sustainability of life. Now is the time to demand profound transformation envisaged to achieve de-growth of fossil fuel based energy and oil derivative production and consumption.

In terms of political advocacy, it would appear essential to stress the need for instruments and mechanisms with which countries and their governments can establish objectives and results in

a multidimensional manner. Economic growth based solely on GNI or similar indicators cannot continue to be the overarching aim of countries. Economic objectives must be measured in terms of their ability to reveal and produce care economies looking out for people and the environment, and in terms of their ability to make capital flows transparent and responsible. These must be the indicators underpinning our political demands. Several alternative objectives can be extracted from each dimension of the Coherence Index. If we are asked about development, we can answer that we are looking for an alternative term —as is already happening in different parts of the world with novel proposals such as good living and de-growth—, unburdened by the colonial, predatory and extractive baggage that has characterized development throughout history. In terms of content, we know that it shuns anthropocentrism and aspires towards eradicating provisions and political actions that fail to take impacts on the different dimensions and territories into account.

Accepting and defending the fact that responsibilities are shared, but not equal.

A general look at country rankings in terms of transitions and impact may not be particularly encouraging given the Coherence Index's ability to shed light on the contradictions and limitations of other views that are more condescending towards current problems. Different perceptions aside, it seems undeniable that we are facing global challenges that are not easily addressed at national level, neither in terms of the description of the problem, nor in terms of States' capacity to tackle them unilaterally. This means that now, perhaps more than any other time in history, is the time for urgent international cooperation. In the face of global challenges, we need tools and mechanisms for the global governance of risks and problems. And naturally, we hope that such governance is carried out according to democratic and essential rights-based principles.

In this connection, policy recommendations point directly to and challenge cooperation policy, a topic which we develop

in Chapter 4 of this report, and particularly in the sections on contributing to global public goods. This, in general terms, calls for an overhaul and a widened scope of multilateral action. Contributions from a country like Spain to the generation of global governance cannot be lukewarm or contingent on national interests. Just the opposite. Spanish cooperation should encourage the transnational negotiation of binding agreements on rights, reductions in harmful emissions, and transformation of production and marketing models. After the trade liberalisation crisis, the unbridled rise of the financial economy and its interests divorced from the real economy, and the growing threat of a return to extreme right-wing nationalism, the multilateral agenda is entirely immersed in an international revamping process. Cooperation's contribution to governing transitions (ecological, energy, digital, etc.) must be a priority based on fairness, multidimensionality and policy coherence. It is not so much a matter of putting these criteria ahead of national interests as it is one of explaining and building narratives that assert and demonstrate how national interests cannot run counter to the sustainability of planetary life.

Spain is a member of a group of particularly privileged countries because of its transition ranking and the enormous planetary impact and pressures it exerts. This privilege underscores the enormous responsibility it must take on in the transformation underway. All the more considering that it is a member of the European Union, which not only provides benefits but also makes it a participant in one of the potentially most influential political spaces on Earth.

Universal public services: the power of decommodifying survival[1]

Jason Hickel, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology - The Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

One of the central insights emerging from research on degrowth and climate mitigation is that universal public services are crucial to a just and effective transition.

Capitalism relies on maintaining an artificial scarcity of essential goods and services (like housing, healthcare, transport, etc), through processes of enclosure and commodification. We know that enclosure enables monopolists to raise prices and maximize their profits (consider the rental market, the US healthcare system, or the British rail system). But it also has another effect. When essential goods are privatized and expensive, people need more income than they would otherwise require to access them. To get it they are compelled to increase their labour in capitalist markets, working to produce new things that may not be needed (with increased energy use, resource use, and ecological pressure) simply to access things that clearly are needed, and which are quite often already there.

Take housing, for example. If your rent goes up, you suddenly have to work more just to keep the same roof over your head. At an economy-wide level, this dynamic means we need more aggregate production — more growth — in order to meet basic needs. From the perspective of capital, this ensures a steady flow of labour for private firms, and maintains downward pressure on wages to facilitate capital accumulation. For the rest of us it means needless exploitation, insecurity, and ecological damage. Artificial scarcity also creates growth dependencies: because survival is mediated by prices and wages, when productivity improvements and recessions lead to

[1]This tribune is a condensed version, authorized by the author for this report, of the article published on 11 April 2023 in the author's blog. (www.jasonhickel.org/blog).

unemployment people suffer loss of access to essential goods — even when the output of those goods is not affected — and growth is needed to create new jobs and resolve the social crisis.

There is a way out of this trap: by decommodifying essential goods and services, we can eliminate artificial scarcity and ensure public abundance, de-link human well-being from growth, and reduce growthist pressures.

This approach also has several other direct social and ecological benefits. For one, it can have a strong positive impact on human welfare. We know from empirical studies that public services are a powerful driver of improvements in life expectancy, well-being, and other key social indicators (here, here and here). Universal services would also end the current cost-of-living crisis, by directly reducing the cost of living.

We also know that countries with decommodified or otherwise universal public services can deliver better social outcomes at any given level of GDP and resource use (here, here, here, here and here). Universal services ensure an efficient conversion of resources and energy into social outcomes. Furthermore, as we will see, public control over provisioning systems makes it easier to achieve rapid decarbonization in those sectors.

Finally, together with a second key policy — the public job guarantee — this approach would permanently end economic insecurity and resolve the current contradiction between social and ecological objectives. Right now it is impossible to take even obvious steps toward climate mitigation (such as scaling down fossil fuel production or other destructive sectors), because people in affected industries would lose access to wages, housing, healthcare, etc. No one should accept such an outcome. With universal services and an emancipatory job guarantee, we can protect against any economic insecurity and guarantee a just transition. There is no necessary contradiction between ecological and social objectives. The two can and must be pursued together.

By universal services here I mean not only healthcare and education, but also housing, transit, nutritious food, energy, water, and communications. In other words, a decommodification of the core social sector — the means of everyday survival. And I mean attractive, high-quality, democratically managed, properly universal services, not the purposefully shitty last-resort systems we see in the US and other neoliberal countries.

The power of universal public services is that we can improve people's access to goods necessary for decent living, with provisioning systems that require less aggregate energy and material use and which allow us to accelerate decarbonization. These outcomes can be further enhanced by ensuring strong democratic governance of public systems. Together with the job guarantee, economic insecurity is permanently abolished — accomplishing a goal that growth alone has never been able to achieve — and human well-being is de-linked from the requirement of ever-increasing aggregate production. This would change the political landscape, freeing us to pursue necessary climate action without any risk to employment and livelihoods, while improving social outcomes, reducing inequality and facilitating a shift toward a more just and ecological economy.

These policies should be core demands of a united climate and labour movement. Universal services, a job guarantee, living wages, a shorter working week — these are popular interventions that could provide the basis for mass political support. For the labour movement, we need to stop pretending that capitalist growth will magically end unemployment, ensure living wages and bring workplace democracy — which it never does — and instead fight to achieve these objectives directly. And for the climate movement, which is often accused of ignoring the material conditions of working-class communities, this approach addresses real bread-and-butter needs and creates cause for alliances with working-class formations

This is the political movement we need.

2.
Public policies for the sustainability of life

2.1. The 2023 Coherence Index (Indico).

Indico 2023.



The map shows the scores of the countries included in the Coherence Index (Indico) which are the result of multiplying the “transitions” score by the planetary pressures index. The score ranges from 0 (worst score) to 100 (best score), from lightest to darkest. For further details see Chapter 5.

Transitions.

The map shows “transitions” scores, that is, the aggregate of the four transitions evaluated for each country in the Coherence Index (democratic, feminist, socio-economic and ecological). The score ranges from 0 (worst score) to 100 (best score), from lightest to darkest. For further details see Chapter 5.

Planetary pressures.



The map shows country scores on the Planetary Pressures Index, which is built on two indicators: per capita material footprint and per capita CO2 emissions, both in terms of consumption. This index ranges from 0 (worst, i.e. higher planetary pressures) to 1 (best score, i.e. lower planetary pressures), from lightest to darkest. For further details see Chapter 5.

The scorecard: transitions, planetary pressures and Indico.

0 - 20 ● (worst score) | 20 - 40 ● | 40 - 60 ● | 60 - 80 ● | 80 - 90 ● | >90 ● (best score)

D Democratic transition
F Feminist transition
S Socio-economic transition
ECO Ecological transition
TRAN Transitions
ECO IMP Planetary pressures

Countries	D	F	S	ECO	TRAN	ECO IMP	INDICO
Afghanistan	4	2	2	2	2	1	2
Albania	3	4	4	4	4	3	4
Algeria	2	2	4	2	2	3	2
Angola	4	4	2	4	4	1	2
Argentina	3	4	4	4	4	4	4
Armenia	4	4	4	4	4	3	4
Australia	4	4	3	4	4	2	2
Austria	1	3	3	4	3	4	4
Azerbaijan	4	4	4	4	4	3	2
Bahamas	4	4	4	4	4	4	2
Bahrain	2	4	4	2	2	4	2
Bangladesh	4	2	4	4	4	1	4
Belarus	2	4	4	4	4	1	4
Belgium	3	1	3	4	3	4	4
Belize	4	4	4	4	4	3	4
Benin	4	2	2	4	4	1	4
Bolivia	4	4	4	4	4	3	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Botswana	4	4	2	4	4	4	2
Brazil	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Brunei	2	2	4	4	4	2	0
Bulgaria	3	4	4	4	4	4	4
Burkina Faso	4	2	2	4	4	1	4
Burundi	4	4	2	2	2	1	2
Cambodia	4	4	4	4	4	1	4
Cameroon	4	4	2	4	4	1	4
Canada	3	3	3	4	4	2	2
Cape Verde	3	4	4	4	4	1	4
Central African Republic	4	2	0	4	2	1	2
Chad	4	2	2	4	2	1	2
Chile	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
China	2	4	4	4	2	4	2

Countries	D	F	S	ECO	TRAN	ECO IMP	INDICO
Colombia							
Congo (Dem. Rep.)							
Congo (Rep.)							
Costa Rica							
Croatia							
Cuba							
Cyprus							
Czechia							
Denmark							
Dominican Republic							
Ecuador							
Egypt							
El Salvador							
Estonia							
Ethiopia							
Fiji							
Finland							
France							
Gambia							
Georgia							
Germany							
Ghana							
Greece							
Guatemala							
Guinea							
Guyana							
Haiti							
Honduras							
Hungary							
Iceland							
India							
Indonesia							
Iran							
Iraq							
Ireland							
Israel							
Italy							
Ivory Coast							
Jamaica							
Japan							
Jordan							

Countries	D	F	S	ECO	TRAN	ECO IMP	INDICO
Kazakhstan							
Kenya							
Kuwait							
Kyrgyzstan							
Laos							
Latvia							
Lebanon							
Lesotho							
Liberia							
Lithuania							
Luxembourg							
Madagascar							
Malawi							
Malaysia							
Mali							
Malta							
Mauritania							
Mauritius							
Mexico							
Moldavia							
Mongolia							
Montenegro							
Morocco							
Mozambique							
Myanmar							
Namibia							
Nepal							
Netherlands							
New Zealand							
Nicaragua							
Niger							
Nigeria							
Northern Macedonia							
Norway							
Oman							
Pakistan							
Panama							
Papua New Guinea							
Paraguay							
Peru							
Philippines							

Countries	D	F	S	ECO	TRAN	ECO IMP	INDICO
Poland	🟡	🟠	🟢	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟠
Portugal	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟠
Qatar	🔴	🔴	🟡	🔴	🔴	🔴	⚫
Romania	🟢	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟠
Russia	🔴	🟠	🟡	🟠	🟠	🟡	🔴
Rwanda	🟠	🟡	🔴	🟠	🟠	🟢	🟠
Saudi Arabia	🔴	🔴	🟡	🔴	🔴	🟠	⚫
Senegal	🟡	🔴	🟠	🟠	🟠	🟢	🟠
Serbia	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟠
Sierra Leone	🟡	🔴	🔴	🟠	🟠	🟢	🔴
Singapore	🟠	🟠	🟡	🔴	🟠	⚫	⚫
Slovakia	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟠
Slovenia	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟠
South Africa	🟡	🟢	⚫	🟠	🔴	🟢	🔴
South Korea	🟠	🟡	🟡	🔴	🟠	🟠	🔴
Spain	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟠
Sri Lanka	🟠	🔴	🟠	🟠	🟠	🟢	🟠
Sudan	🟠	🔴	🔴	🔴	🔴	🟢	🔴
Sweden	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟠	🟢	🟡	🟠
Switzerland	🟢	🟢	🟡	🟠	🟡	🟠	🔴
Syria	🔴	🔴	🟠	⚫	🔴	🟢	🔴
Tanzania	🟠	🟠	🔴	🟠	🟠	🟢	🟠
Thailand	🟠	🟠	🟡	🟠	🟠	🟢	🟠
Togo	🟠	🟠	🔴	🟠	🟠	🟢	🟠
Trinidad and Tobago	🟡	🟠	🟡	🟠	🟠	⚫	⚫
Tunisia	🟡	🟠	🟡	🔴	🟠	🟢	🟠
Turkey	🟠	🟠	🟡	🔴	🟠	🟡	🔴
Uganda	🟠	🟠	🔴	🟠	🟠	🟢	🟠
Ukraine	🟡	🟠	🟡	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟠
United Arab Emirates	🔴	🟠	🟡	🔴	🔴	⚫	⚫
United Kingdom	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟠
United States	🔴	🟡	🟡	🔴	🟠	🟠	⚫
Uruguay	🟢	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟠
Uzbekistan	🔴	🟠	🟡	⚫	🔴	🟢	🔴
Venezuela	🟠	🟠	🟠	🟠	🟠	🟡	🟠
Vietnam	🔴	🟠	🟠	🟠	🟠	🟢	🟠
Yemen	🔴	⚫	🟠	⚫	⚫	🟢	⚫
Zambia	🟠	🟠	⚫	🟡	🔴	🟢	🔴
Zimbabwe	🔴	🟠	🔴	🟠	🟠	🟢	🟠

Source: own data.

2.2. A scorecard to transform the world.

The 2023 Coherence Index includes a scorecard designed to explore, analyse and compare the main challenges that countries face in terms of policy coherence with sustainable development. One of the main contributions of the tool's new edition is that it offers several levels of complementary and interrelated analysis to delve deeper into the varying nature of the problems and conflicts countries face, and serves as a better guide regarding the transformations and strategies they need to promote in order to evolve towards economic and social organization that is more coherent with sustainable development.

Policy coherence and income level.

Following up on the analysis performed in the previous chapter, a look at the average scores of countries by income level (Graph 2.1) shows how, in aggregate terms, countries with higher income score higher, on average, in the aggregate

Graph 2.1.
Transitions and ecological pressures by income level.



Source: own data.

of transitions and lower on the ecological pressures index, reflecting their greater contribution to the destabilization of the planetary system. In contrast, countries with lower income levels have high average scores on the ecological pressures index and low scores on transitions. This simple analysis shows the different types of challenges countries face related to their income level in aggregate terms and points to the greater responsibility that high-income countries must accept in the necessary transformation to address the ecological crisis. The graph also shows how neither group simultaneously scores high in the aggregate of transitions and in the ecological pressures index. This confirms the urgent need to develop new lifestyles and social organization enabling us to guarantee the well-being of people while respecting the planet's limits. This analysis must be interpreted considering the great heterogeneity between the countries in each group. More detailed complementary analyses would be needed to draw more precise conclusions.

The above analysis can be taken a step further by examining the average scores that these groups of countries obtain in the different transitions. As Graph 2.2 shows, high-income countries score better, on average, on socio-economic, feminist and democratic transitions, but are more challenged in the ecological area. In contrast, low-income countries are more challenged in terms of socioeconomic, feminist, and democratic transitions.

Gráfico 2.2.
Democratic, feminist, socio-economic and ecological transitions and planetary pressures by income level.



Source: own data.

Delving deeper into transitions: dimension analysis.

Analysis of dimension scores enables us to take a closer look at the challenges that the different groups of countries face in each of the transitions (Figure 2.1). As the graph shows, in the democratic transition area high-income countries have better average scores in the civil society and political commitment to human rights and international justice dimensions, while lower-income countries have better average scores in militarization because of their lower military spending and lesser participation in the international arms trade, meaning they contribute less to global militarization.

Figure 2.1.
Dimensions and planetary pressures by income level, Indico 2023.



D	Democratic transition	**F**	Feminist transition	**S**	Socio-economic transition
SC	Civil society and transparency	**LEG**	Legal and regulatory framework	**SOC**	Social situation
DDHH	Political commitment to human rights and justice	**SOC**	Social situation of women	**EMP**	Employment
MILIT	Militarization	**POL**	Political participation	**FIS**	Taxation
		BRECH	Gender gaps	**SSBB**	Basic services
				DESIG	Inequality
				ECO	Ecological transition
				ECO IMP	Planetary pressures

Source: own data.

In the feminist transition, all groups exhibit significant shortfalls in the establishment of regulatory and legislative frameworks that protect women's rights and ensure equality and respect for diversity and women's political participation in public decision-making processes. Moreover, lower-income groups face greater difficulties guaranteeing women's access to education, healthcare, and a life free of violence, and are characterized by wider gender gaps in labour market participation, financial inclusion and education.

In the socio-economic transition, attention should be drawn to the important problems facing lower-income countries in ensuring the populations' access to social rights such as education, healthcare, and social protection, as well as basic services like electricity, water and the Internet. The figure shows that these countries are also struggling with employment and taxation issues. Generally speaking, low-income countries do not have sound fiscal policies to ensure social rights for their populations and combat inequality. High-income countries face their own set of challenges in this area. As discussed below, this is largely due to the fact that some of the countries in this group (including the United States, Switzerland, Singapore and Luxembourg) are the main providers of financial secrecy worldwide, i.e. they do not readily reveal tax and financial information to the competent authorities which contributes to eroding the tax base of many countries.

Figure 2.1 also shows that this group has room for improvement in the socioeconomic dimension, as some countries exhibit significant deficits in exposing the population to air pollution, number of doctors per 100,000 inhabitants and public spending on social protection. Lastly, the high-income group is the one with the highest average score on income inequality as measured by the Palma Index. This stresses the importance of combatting inequality for most countries around the world.

An analysis of ecological transition scores and the ecological pressures index reflects the important challenges that all countries face in the current environmental crisis. All groups of countries earned mediocre ecological transition scores and the group of high-income countries is the one that exerts the greatest ecological impact and pressures on the planet. This shows, as discussed in the previous chapter, that the richest countries are mainly responsible for the ecological crisis that the planet is undergoing.

Policy coherence and cosmopolitanism.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the virtues of the Coherence Index is that it analyses policies' cross-border impacts and therefore eschews the notion that development processes are strictly national. The cosmopolitan perspective of the public policy analysis put forward by the index prompts us to think beyond the traditional notion that evaluates such policies based mainly on their effects on the people living within the borders of the countries that apply them, and considers the effects that these policies have on other geographies. For instance, the Coherence Index considers the cross-border dimension as a key element in the analysis of fiscal policies and others related to democracy, incorporating the impacts they have on other geographies. Next, we will explore what the 2023 Coherence Index means for democratic transition and the fiscal dimension of the socio-economic transition.

Democratic transition: Towards a cosmopolitan democracy.

As the scorecard shows, many of the countries evaluated feature significant shortfalls in democracy. According to CIVICUS, a growing number of people live in countries where civic space is restricted, and worrying trends toward diminishing civic space are observed in most countries. According to information published annually by this network of civil society organizations, only 20 of the 153 countries evaluated by the Coherence Index have a civic space that can be characterized

as open[8], i.e. countries where freedom of expression and peaceful association and assembly are ensured[9]. The Coherence Index also shows significant waning in commitment to major international human rights and universal justice treaties and international labour standards. Examples of countries with low scores in this dimension are Egypt, Syria, Qatar, Bahrain, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Myanmar, Iran and Brunei. Only a small group of countries contributes significantly to the militarization of the planet, 10 of which are shown in Graph 2.3. All but Algeria and Saudi Arabia possess nuclear weapons and are among the world's leading arms exporters and/or importers. Several of them, such as Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Israel, are also among the Coherence Index countries with the highest level of military spending as a percentage of GDP.

A closer look at the numbers shows that some countries with good scores in terms of civic space where freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly is protected, aspects typically evaluated in the most conventional democracy indexes where a "national" view predominates, are penalized in the Coherence Index for their weak commitment to major international

[8] These countries are Ireland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Austria, New Zealand, Finland, Estonia, Uruguay, Iceland, Lithuania, Sweden, Portugal, Cyprus, Canada, Albania, Cape Verde, Norway, Switzerland, Netherlands, and Germany.

[9] Information from the 2021 Civicus Monitor.

Graph 2.3.
Militarization dimension, the bottom ten countries.



Source: own data.

treaties and/or their contribution to global militarization. For example, the United Kingdom and France (or, to a lesser extent, Germany and Spain) have a significantly lower score on democratic transition as a result of their greater contribution to global militarization. The United States is also penalized by its limited political commitment to the main international human rights and justice treaties, and to international labour standards, coming in at the bottom of the democratic transition ranking.

From the perspective of the Coherence Index, the construction of democracy is not an exclusively national task. This holds even more today considering the evident need for democratic global governance bodies to address multiple challenges, i.e. bodies in which the commitment to agreements and advances in international law, as well as values contrary to the militarization of societies, are considered fundamental. Hence, when evaluating countries, the Coherence Index not only considers the democratic rights enjoyed by the population within each country, but also countries' commitment to global democratic governance and their contribution to ensuring peace as a global public good.

Too many guns and too little butter

Jordi Calvo, Centre of Studies for Peace J.M. Delàs

The most recent figures on global military spending are discouraging. According to SIPRI, in 2022 the world's military budget grew by 3.75% to $2.24 trillion, higher than the GDP of Italy. This report reveals that the Asia-Pacific region, identified some time ago as the scene of all future tension with China in everyone's gaze, has increased its military spending by 45% over the last decade. This region has become the world leader in terms of developing its military muscle. But the United States is still number one in military spending; $877 billion (39%), three times more than second ranked China and ten times more than Russia which ranks third.

Military spending is on the rise in Europe, making it, taken all together, the world's number two region after the US. This means that, for another year running, NATO and its closest allies (Japan, Australia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia...) account for the largest percentage of the world's military spending. And this is not expected to change any time soon judging from announcements by the main European countries of larger military budgets. At the NATO summit in Madrid, France, Germany, Italy, UK, Spain, Poland, Hungary and nearly all of Europe promised to reach 2% of GDP in military spending within the next few years. The European Union is on board with this militaristic trend and has budgeted over €5 billion, appearing for the first time in the international analysis on military spending because of the funds that Borrell injected into the European External Action Service in the midst of the war in Ukraine.

The Middle East is another region that is remilitarizing. Saudi Arabia has risen to fifth place in the ranking, returning to levels of military spending that characterized it in the past. It should be noted that Spanish arms companies benefit considerably from that country's military expenditure, the lion's share going to Navantia which is building warships on their way to the Arabian Sea. The positive note this year comes from South America which has reduced military spending over the last decade by 5.4%, taking a different approach to regional security. Sub-Saharan

Africa has also significantly reduced military budgets over the past year, although the region's numerous unresolved conflicts point to an unstable future.

Any discussion on military spending deserves a historical perspective ranging beyond the data from this last year. More than three decades ago, with the end of the Cold War, an encouraging dialogue was established on what to do with the economic resources that would be freed up by reducing defence spending. The billions of dollars that would no longer be spent on armies, weapons, and other military endeavours inherent to the show of strength between the United States and the Soviet Union, were known as the dividends of peace. Many proposals emerged at that time and most envisaged increased spending on development cooperation. In 1988, world military spending reached a peak of $1.6 trillion. The end of the Cold War alone freed up $5 trillion that were no longer spent on militarization, more than Germany's current GDP and close to the GDP of all of Latin America and the Caribbean combined. It took 18 years to reach the levels of military spending prevalent before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

It is safe to say that today the dividends of peace have melted away. We have earmarked more for the arms race than was saved by the short-lived paradigm shift in the 1990's. Dividends for peace are directly related to the dilemma first described by economist Paul Samuelson, guns or butter, which describes the economy as the management of scarcity where we constantly have to choose how to allocate countries' resources. Samuelson referred to this choice as opportunity cost. Thus, for every euro we spend on guns we have one euro less to spend on butter. This means that the decision of what to spend public money on has an immediate effect on public policies and on the security model we are building.

The military-industrial complex is once again at the centre of the world economy as missiles are raining down on Ukraine. Every day 10,000 are launched by the Russians and 7,000 by the Ukrainian army. The industry cannot keep pace with demand. They simply do not have the capacity to produce that amount of munition. Companies make new

investments with a view to increasing production, but they demand assurances from governments before they do. What better assurance for their investments than a world at war? The neo-con hawks in the US led their country and convinced much of the world to choose the military route to fight terrorism in costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, the enemy justifying military investment is China and, for the time being, Russia. Ukraine is a good example of this militaristic trend. Both sides have chosen the path of force to resolve a conflict that is certainly more complex than they would have us believe. In Europe, despite years of exacerbated remilitarization, no one could see war on the horizon. Will we have the same regrets in the Asia-Pacific region in a few years' time? Good times for the arms business mean bad times for peace and security.

As our mentor Arcadi Oliveres reminds us, despite the prevailing pessimism, we must remain hopeful. While it is true that many countries, although no more than 30 or 40, have opted for militarization, they are no safer than the 31 states that have no army or the 100 and some whose military capacity cannot be considered a threat to anyone. They prove that security without guns is both possible and desirable.

Socio-economic transition: Towards a cosmopolitan fiscal policy.

The "fiscal" dimension of the socio-economic transition assesses the extent to which countries have strong and redistributive fiscal policies to finance social rights and basic services for the population and combat income inequality and incorporate the cosmopolitan perspective. The most coherent countries are those with greater fiscal margin, more progressive tax policies that contribute to reducing inequality, and less financial secrecy, i.e. those that are the least tolerant of tax fraud and money laundering[10].

As shown in Graphs 2.4 and Graphs 2.5, the countries with the highest tax revenue as a percentage of GDP and those featuring the greatest reduction in inequality thanks to fiscal policy and transfers are, for the most part, high-income European countries with a very high HDI.

[10] https://fsi.taxjustice.net/

Graph 2.4.
The ten countries with the highest government revenue (% GDP), 2019.



Source: International Monetary Fund.

Graph 2.5.
The ten countries with the greatest reduction in the Gini Index before and after taxes and transfers (%), 2017 - 2020.



Source: University of Harvard.

Graph 2.6 shows the ten most notorious countries in terms of financial secrecy, which occurs when a jurisdiction fails to share pertinent information with the competent authorities. By allowing financial secrecy, countries make it easier for the wealthy, multinational corporations and criminals to conceal their assets and avoid paying their lawful tax bill. This has important consequences in terms of how the economic system

Graph 2.6.
The ten countries with the highest Financial Secrecy Index, 2020.



Source: Tax Justice Network.

operates. It diverts investment and financial flows away from other, more productive uses, makes it difficult to implement effective regulations, and facilitates criminal impunity. It also funnels off resources that could be used for the general interest meaning that a small group of people from among the economic and financial elite and multinational companies benefit at the expense of the well-being of much of the world population, contributing to increased inequality.

Therefore, from a cosmopolitan perspective, it is not enough for countries to have solid and redistributive tax systems ensuring an acceptable level of social welfare for their population and reducing inequality if, at the same time, they are making it easy for people and companies to evade taxes and therefore contribute to eroding the tax base of other countries, thus reducing the public resources with which to finance their welfare state[11]. Indico (and the coherence approach) gives us a more accurate snapshot of the real contribution to a fairer transition that countries are making by incorporating the transnational impact of permissive tax policies and those that promote financial secrecy. Hence, some countries with relatively high scores in tax revenue and inequality reduction end up with a lower score because they are penalized for financial secrecy. For example, Switzerland and the United States, the two countries with the most protective financial secrecy laws in the world, fell by more than 90 positions in the ranking on the fiscal dimension, the United Arab Emirates and China by 82 and 81 positions respectively, Luxembourg 73, and the Netherlands and the United Kingdom by more than 30.

[11] This is measured through the Financial Secrecy Index drawn up by the Tax Justice Network. For further details see: https://fsi.taxjustice.net/

Feminist coherence.

The Coherence Index assesses the extent to which countries integrate a feminist perspective into their public policies. As shown below, the data in the index help explore some of the important challenges facing countries when designing and implementing policies with a feminist perspective. These challenges are observed in countries of all geographic areas, income level and HDI. Before analysing the data, it is important to point out that the tool has some limitations when it comes to adequately reflecting this perspective, mostly because there is a lack of indicators with the necessary ambition to measure what it means to incorporate a feminist point of view into public policies for such a large and heterogeneous group of countries. This underscores the urgent need to develop indicators and statistical information with which to fully and ambitiously analyse policies from a feminist perspective. For example, indicators suited to a greater number of countries are needed to assess issues particularly important from a feminist perspective such as the unequal distribution of unpaid work between men and women, access to affective-sexual education and contraception, to name only a few.

Political participation is one of the dimensions of the feminist transition where Coherence Index countries face the biggest challenges. Graph 2.7 shows the percentage of seats held by women in National Parliaments and women in ministerial positions in the ten countries with the best score in the "political participation" dimension. Only two of these countries, Nicaragua and Rwanda, have achieved parity on both indicators. This shows that a lot of work still needs to be done to achieve parity between men and women in decision-making roles throughout the world. For example, in the European Union only six countries have achieved parity in ministerial positions and none in national parliaments. In Slovenia, Malta, Estonia, Greece, Romania and Poland, women hold fewer than 20% of ministerial positions, and in Slovakia, Ireland, Greece, Romania, Cyprus, Malta and Hungary, women account for fewer than 25% of parliamentary members. In Japan, a country with a very high level of human development, these percentages

Graph 2.7.
Political participation dimension, top ten countries, 2020.



Source: World Bank.

are below 10%. While there are many factors accounting for this, we would stress that women in these societies face multiple and diverse barriers to full participation in public life and political representation commensurate with the proportion of the of the population they represent. Coherence offers us the opportunity to view these difficulties as a problem and address them through a demand for public action.

Another dimension where there is significant room for improvement is the establishment of regulatory and legislative frameworks that ensure the rights of women and LGTBI people. According to the OECD (2019), no country in the world has legislation that comprehensively protects women against all forms of violence without exception; 64% of the countries evaluated by the Coherence Index seriously restrict the right to abortion and 45% do not have legislation that requires the same remuneration for men and women for work of equal value. Moreover, according to ILGA data from 2020, 46 of the countries assessed by the Coherence Index have legal provisions criminalizing consensual same-sex relations[12].

In terms of social welfare, it is worth noting the significant difficulties that many low-income countries have in guaranteeing women's access to education and healthcare. The data also show that violence against women is a global problem. According to the OECD (2019), globally, 32% of women who have ever had a partner have suffered violence from that partner at least once in their life. The prevalence of such violence in the countries assessed by the Coherence Index ranges from 1.9% in Canada to 85% in Pakistan. South Asia is the region where the highest levels of gender-based violence are observed. It should also be noted that these figures underestimate the true levels of violence. Due to social norms and the risk of stigmatization, many women, especially from the most vulnerable groups, choose not to report these rights violations.

The Coherence Index also sheds light on the gender gap, i.e. differences in access to the labour market, financial institutions and education. According to available statistical information,

[12] https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_Mundo_Homofobia_de_Estado_Actualizacion_Panorama_global_Legislacion_diciembre_2020.pdf

the regions facing the greatest challenges in this dimension are South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa. As for participation in the labour market, according to the ILO[13], women throughout the world have a harder time finding work than their male counterparts. According to the information provided by this international organization, the participation rate of women in the active population worldwide is approximately 49% compared to 75% for men, a gap of 26 points. As Graph 2.8 shows, this gap may be even greater in many countries, in excess of 50 percentage points in some. Women also encounter greater difficulties than men in gaining access to the financial system, although the gap, in general terms, is smaller than in finding employment.

[13] https://www.ilo.org/infostories/es-ES/Stories/Employment/barriers-women#global-gap

Graph 2.8.
The ten countries with the widest gender gap in labour force participation rates (% men -% women), 2021.



Source: International Labor Organization (ILO).

Regarding account holders at financial institutions and mobile money service providers, Graph 2.9 shows the ten countries in the Coherence Index with the largest gender gap, exceeding 20 points for Nigeria, Mozambique, Turkey, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria and the Ivory Coast. As for education, the greatest challenges are found in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia where the gender gap, measured as the average number of years that women and men are enrolled in school, stands at 25.42% and 19.51% respectively, being significantly lower in the rest of the regions.

Despite the previously explained limitations, thanks to this information on feminist transition provided by the Coherence Index, we can identify some of the main shortcomings of public policies from a feminist perspective, and the impact they have on the lives of women and their exercising their rights throughout the world.

Gráfico 2.9.
The ten countries with the widest gender gap in account holders at financial institutions and mobile money service providers (% men -% women), 2017.



Source: World Bank.

Transformative public policies require a feminist perspective

Liz Meléndez, Executive Director of the Peruvian Women's Centre Flora Tristán

The spread of authoritarian and fundamentalist ideas, together with weakening democracies in Latin America, endanger women's rights and equality which has served as an ethical and principled basis on which momentous changes were being achieved.

In recent years, conservative sectors with a broad power base have deployed strategies such as the so-called "Don't mess with my kids" movement seeking to delegitimize the feminist struggle, dispute social ideas, and eradicate the gender equality approach from national public policy. They have also placed political operators in decision-making positions and in so doing have retreated in the fight against discrimination and blocked progress aimed at bolstering the rights of women and the LGBTIQ+ community.

The objective of these sectors is to thwart further progress in the form of regulatory, cultural, political, and economic change as such change has a direct impact on the patriarchal order that dominates our societies. It is important to note that those who oppose equality also promote a narrative that runs counter to human rights and democracy.

Although the outlook is quite discouraging in Peru and the rest of Latin America, there is a variable that helps us hold our ground in these situations: strong, permanent, and diverse forms of feminism with a great capacity to question, mobilize and transform.

These feminisms are recognized as a source of critical thinking and political action. They call absolute truths into question and shed light on the systems of oppression that exacerbate inequality. They not only reject the patriarchal order but also link it to other systems of oppression and expropriation that perpetuate violence and exclusion.

Decolonial, anti-racist, intersectional, and ecologist feminisms draw attention to the damage caused by patriarchal societies by reproducing a political, economic, and racialized system under a regulatory order of

domination and moral superiority where women (and everything feminised) are the object of suspicion (Segato, 2021).

The existence of the feminist movement and its broad and diverse agenda, as well as its strength and ability to bring about far-reaching transnational debates, represent opportunities for the construction of a true democracy resting on the fundamental pillars of autonomy of all people, equality, and the effective exercising of individual and collective rights.

A democratic state must promote public policies to address social problems and guarantee the well-being of those most vulnerable who find themselves in situations of exclusion. What I propose here is that the feminist approach (not a mere gender approach) can contribute to a proper design and implementation of comprehensive measures that ensure citizens' well-being in the short, medium, and long term. In other words, the feminist approach should be followed designing, building, implementing, and evaluating public policy as the degree of analysis offered by this perspective is not only broad but also comprehensive of the different contexts and historical power relations that impact social relations, the daily life of all people and social institutions.

In this connection, the feminist perspective has great potential to the extent that it can: (1) enable us to understand the complexity of specific problems and (2) design transformative proposals aimed at ensuring real or substantive equality.

Before continuing, it is important to clarify what we mean by public policy. According to Subirats and Lahera, a public policy is a set of coherent, inter-related decisions and actions that must be intrinsically understood as related to the prevailing political and historical context. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights points out that a 'public policy' refers to courses of action that contribute to changing, creating, or transforming conditions that affect the lives of individuals or groups of a population (IACHR 2018: 143). In other words, the IACHR places rights-based social transformation at the centre, highlighting the role played by states not only in addressing social problems but also in preventing them, an obligation consistent with the mandate of non-discrimination. From this perspective, public policies are not only aimed at addressing a specific problem but also at promoting sustained transformations that contribute to the eradication of discrimination.

Feminist theory has developed two frameworks of analysis to understand the complexity of social problems shedding light on power relations and how they have become anchored in society: the framework of intersectionality and the approaches of decolonial feminism.

Intersectionality suggests viewing social injustice through a new prism (Crenshaw, 2016), leaving aside the classic paradigms of understanding and explanation and building new points of reference that acknowledge different identities. It is a tool with which to question neutral analyses and draw attention to the individual experience of each case, considering the impact of racism, classism, and heteronormativity.

This category has come to enrich the discussion surrounding structural and symbolic violence forming the basis of multiple aggressions, especially those directed at women. Its usefulness lies not only in providing us with a broad framework within which to understand discrimination and violence but also, at the level of public policy, helps to bring scenarios of vulnerability into focus through public policy.

Thanks to this conceptual framework we can conclude that, while the gender approach is fundamental, it is insufficient. It needs to link up with other conceptual frameworks to understand how discrimination works, for example, in the lives of women and survivors of violence, and no longer treat them as a homogeneous group.

Decolonial feminism addresses the problematic reality of racialized women impacted by colonialism and institutional narratives. It first questions hegemonic western feminism and criticizes racialized, heterosexual, colonial and capitalist gender oppression as a way to transform the social order and break with the subjective dichotomies that have continued to colonize thought (Lugones 2011).

Intersectional and decolonial feminism provide us with tools to understand the complexity of power relations and how these are inscribed in women's lives and bodies. Both are feminist conceptual frameworks that should be used in the construction of public policies to the extent that they contribute to generating true transformation. They define levels of vulnerability within the population, and propose measures that take both history and context into consideration.

A public policy with a feminist approach is aimed at eroding power relations and is, therefore, highly transformative. However, as mentioned above, we are facing the expansion of sectors opposed to human rights and equality whose biologistic, absolutist and authoritarian narrative normalizes exclusion and stigmatizes rights defenders and feminists. And this only serves to exacerbate resistance to change and weakens the state's gender approach while also posing a strong barrier to the implementation of transformative and comprehensive approaches such as the feminist frameworks described.

Perhaps one of today's main challenges is that of facing extremisms and thoughts and practices contrary to human rights. This fundamentalism puts wind in the sails of movements seeking to curtail women's rights and do away with gender equality.

Developing public policies from a feminist perspective requires political will, democratic values, and a rights-based approach since this way of viewing society seeks to go far beyond the rationale of equal opportunity and suggests recognizing and unveiling power relations, and implementing transformative measures for real change. This is a challenge that remains to be tackled.

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3. Policy coherence as a strategy to transform relations between the European Union and Latin America

Based on the information provided by the Indico, this chapter conducts a focused analysis of policy coherence for sustainable development in European Union[14] and Latin American countries. These two regions have had diplomatic relations and cooperation ties since the end of the 20th century. Politically, these ties have taken the form of summits between the European Union and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), EU-CELAC, which are held periodically with the aim of strengthening economic, political and social relations.

Taking advantage of the fact that the third EU-CELAC Summit will be held in Brussels in July 2023, the main objective of this analysis was to offer a comparative overview of the two regions from the point of view of policy coherence for sustainable development and, based on the results, make recommendations for political advocacy in this area.

To that end, this section has been divided into three parts. The first provides a general overview of the EU and Latin America's performance on transitions and planetary impact and pressures. The second compares the two regions in each of the transitions, stressing those indicators that are considered most relevant and may shed more light on the subject. Lastly, policy recommendations are developed based on the document's findings.

One caveat before we begin. For the sake of comparing the two regions, an aggregate analysis was conducted based on the average of all EU countries, on the one hand, and CELAC countries, on the other, for each of the transitions and indicators analysed.

While this aggregate number does give us a general picture and offers very valuable information, it is very important to consider the great regional heterogeneity that exists in both cases.

[14] Although the European Union has specific powers in some areas, this chapter is based on the results obtained by its Member States. Therefore, this should not be interpreted as an analysis of EU policy coherence but rather of that of its member states.

A more precise snapshot of coherence performance would require a more thorough complementary analysis. Table 3.1 shows the countries included in the analysis.

Table 3.1.
European Union and Latin America countries included in the analysis.

EUROPEAN UNION	CELAC
Austria	Argentina
Belgium	Bahamas
Bulgaria	Belize
Croatia	Bolivia
Cyprus	Brazil
Czechia	Chile
Denmark	Colombia
Estonia	Costa Rica
Finland	Cuba
France	Dominican Republic
Germany	Ecuador
Greece	El Salvador
Hungary	Guatemala
Ireland	Guyana
Italy	Haiti
Latvia	Honduras
Lithuania	Jamaica
Luxembourg	Mexico
Netherlands	Nicaragua
Poland	Panama
Portugal	Paraguay
Romania	Peru
Slovakia	Trinidad and Tobago
Slovenia	Uruguay
Spain	Venezuela
Sweden	

Source: own data.

3.1. The European Union and Latin America: two contrasting development models.

This section compares the results of the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC countries), addressing them as two different ways of "living on the planet". This form of analysis stands in juxtaposition with the traditional view of development based on stages of the modernization process. Although this view has been outdated for decades and most of the epistemic development community has a more plural view of development processes, in practice it continues to be the basis for diplomatic relations between the two regions and, consequently, for cooperation policies as well.

Graph 3.1 shows that the European Union performs better in most transitions. The socioeconomic and democratic transition stand out as there is a fairly large difference with the average performance of Latin America. Differences on the ecological and feminist transitions are not as pronounced but are still significant.

Graph 3.1.
Transitions and planetary pressures, EU and Latin America.



Note: In this graph, values corresponding to planetary pressures have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate comparison with the transitions.

Source: own data.

Both regions perform above the average coherence index in most of the transitions. However, Latin America comes out at the Indico average in the socioeconomic transition.

However, the global impact and pressures results are the most significant in this graph and here Latin America outperforms the European Union. To be clear, the way EU countries are developing is a problem for the planet, while the way that Latin American countries are developing, even though they need to make changes to increase their coherence, does not contribute with the same intensity to jeopardizing the development of future generations.

The way EU countries are developing is a problem for the planet

For the sake of argument, one could assert that the heterogeneity of Latin American countries means that they cannot be lumped together as a group, and that the limited impact and global pressures is due to a low level of human development. Taking these objections into consideration, we will now delve deeper into the analysis and compare only the EU countries with those Latin American countries scoring very high on the HDI.

This comparison is intended to show the cost, in terms of environmental impact and pressures, of the different development models and expound upon the question raised in chapter one about how to make the highest levels of development compatible with limited environmental impact and pressures. For comparison purposes, we decided to exclude two Latin American countries with a very high HDI from the analysis because of their very specific and peculiar characteristics resulting from their geographical location: Trinidad and Tobago and Bahamas. The countries included in the analysis are Chile, Costa Rica, Argentina, Panama and Uruguay.

Graph 3.2.
Transitions and planetary pressures, EU and Latin America, countries with very high HDI.



Note: In this graph, values corresponding to planetary pressures have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate comparison with the transitions.

Source: own data.

This graph shows a significantly different result compared to the previous one. Although in the socioeconomic transition European Union countries continue to perform much better on average, the differences are smaller in the rest of the transitions. In terms of planetary impact and pressures, very high HDI countries in Latin America continue to outperform EU countries.

To be perfectly clear, all countries must make transformations in terms of policy coherence for sustainable development. However, it is possible to progress in areas that are vital to the PCSD in a sustainable manner such as democratic and feminist transition. Social progress can also be made, provided that the welfare model is transformed from one highly dependent on unsustainable consumption and production to one focused on more environmentally friendly services.

3.2. The European Union and Latin America, transition by transition.

Next, we will draw a comparison between the two regions for each of the transitions, paying attention to the different indicators. It is important to again point out that we are using averages as they allow us to make a general comparison but must be interpreted with caution due to the heterogeneity of these regions.

Democratic transition.

Graph 3.3 shows the comparison between the average scores of the European Union and Latin America for each of the indicators comprising the democratic transition. Generally, the EU performs better in nearly all indicators. Major differences arise in two types of indicators: first, in the Civicus Monitor indicator which measures civil society participation (D-SC1), and the Open Government Index (D-SC2); secondly, women's access to justice (D-DDHH6) and the existence of a plan to implement resolution 1325 (D-DDHH7). In other words, information attesting to countries' commitment to the inclusion of women in peace processes, justice, and post-conflict reconstruction.

An initial conclusion can be drawn from these data. EU countries generally have more open and democratic institutions and are more proactive in making them inclusive for women. This generates more institutionalized mechanisms for civil society participation in politics, creating a more solid and democratic civic space.

Significant differences in favour of the European Union can also be detected in the indicators signalling international commitment to human rights. The abolition of the death penalty is especially noteworthy. EU countries have completely abolished this practice from their legal systems, while this is the case for only 14 out of 27 countries in Latin America. In the indicators having to do with the signing of international human rights commitments the data are similar, with no significant differences for almost any of the indicators.

Graph 3.3.
Democratic transition indicators in the EU and Latin America.



Note: The values represented in the graph correspond to the average of the standardized transition indicator values for the countries in each regional group. For the complete denomination of the indicators for each code, see Table 5.1.

Source: own data.

In contrast, perceivable differences exist regarding the indicators that evaluate militarization. Latin America on average scores better in this area than the European Union on all indicators. Indicator D-DDHH5, which evaluates participation in arms treaties and conventions, stands out. The fact that more Latin American countries have ratified arms control treaties and conventions gives us a good idea of the differences in this regard.

These differences become more pronounced when we look at the indicators that specifically focus on contributions to global militarization: EU countries contribute negatively to world stability and peace when compared to their Latin American counterparts. On average, EU countries spend more on the military, pose a greater nuclear threat and, above all, are more responsible for our having to live on a planet with an increasing number of weapons thus making it more insecure.

In short, while a holistic analysis of the democratic transition suggests that EU countries are more coherent with sustainable development, a closer look leads to a more nuanced conclusion as there are still important challenges that EU countries needs to address.

Feminist transition.

The second graph analyses the scores of the two blocks on the indicators of the feminist transition. Here, the graph speaks for itself.

Graph 3.4.
Feminist transition indicators in the EU and Latin America.



Note: The values represented in the graph correspond to the average of the standardized transition indicator values for the countries in each regional group. For the complete denomination of the indicators for each code, see Table 5.1.

Source: own data.

Except for the ratification of Convention 189 (F-LEG7) which we will analyse at the end of this subsection, EU countries score higher when it comes to equality between men and women. Two indicators especially stand out where the average for EU countries is nearly double that of Latin America: legislation to regulate the voluntary interruption of pregnancy (F-LEG3) and legislation that requires equal remuneration for men and women (F-LEG6). In both cases, the European Union has more advanced legislation. Regarding the first indicator (F-LEG3), 25 out of 27 U countries fully recognize this right (Finland and Poland being the only exceptions) compared to only 5 in Latin America (Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, Guyana and Cuba). Regarding the second (F-LEG6), equal pay is the law in 25 out of 27 countries in the EU (the exceptions being Hungary and Slovenia) compared to 10 out of 27 in Latin America.

These two indicators sum up the overall outcome of this transition quite well. The rest of the indicators give us the complete picture. There are very important differences when it comes to the recognition of LGTBI families, equality at the workplace, the presence of women at all levels of education and data attesting to gender gaps. Again, it is important to understand that these are averages and that important differences are quite possible in both regions. As for women in the political arena, there is a minor difference in favour of the European Union.

In this transition, there is only one difference in favour of Latin America and that is indicator F-LEG7 which refers to the ratification of ILO Convention 189 on domestic workers. Here, 14 Latin American countries have ratified this convention compared to only 7 from the European Union.

This is very significant as it has to do with sustainable development.

Different positions in the international development system would seem to imply different interests from the point of view of the feminist transition. The issue of domestic work is intrinsically linked to global care chains. This concept, which

stems from the feminist critique of the Economy, suggests that caretaking has been trans-nationalized during the neoliberal globalization process. This means that caretaking work, traditionally performed by women, is of vital importance. In fact, it is one of the pillars supporting the globalized economy and, to a large extent, has given rise to these good results in European countries' socioeconomic transition. According to data from Intermón Oxfam, in 2021, 56% of domestic and care workers in Spain were migrants, up to 23% of them irregular migrants, while 9 out of 10 live-in domestic workers are foreigners.

These figures typically indicate serious inequalities both in terms of gender and class. It is precisely these inequalities that ILO Convention 189 seeks to eliminate. That is why it is very noteworthy that this agreement has been signed by more Latin American countries, the origin of a large proportion of those workers who perform their caretaking duties outside of their home countries, but is met with a degree of disinterest on the part of the EU countries (at least compared to the general trend in this regard).

This issue is very important in the construction of new development paradigms currently in the making, where a new social contract focusing on care (of people and the environment) is forcefully emerging as an alternative to the social contract that renders caretaking jobs invisible and externalizes environmental impacts. This is one of the main contributions that the feminist transition can make. The EU lags behind Latin America in this respect and this represents a challenge both for European policy and for cooperation policies between the two regions.

Socioeconomic transition.

In the third of the transitions, the graph shows a similar result to that of the feminist transition. On average, EU countries obtained better results than their Latin American counterparts on all indicators except one.

Graph 3.5.
Socio-economic transition indicators in the EU and Latin America.



Note: The values represented in the graph correspond to the average of the standardized transition indicator values for the countries in each regional group. For the complete denomination of the indicators for each code, see Table 5.1.

Source: own data.

The EU performed ostensibly better on two indicators related to the social situation and two on taxation. These are indicators S-SOC4 (people exposed to high levels of air pollution) and S-SOC5 (social protection spending as a percentage of GDP). In both cases, EU countries scored much higher than Latin America.

There are also very important differences on indicators S-FIS1 y S-FIS2. These indicators refer to fiscal policies' capacity to reduce income inequalities. In both cases, data show the structural weakness of Latin America in terms of its fiscal institutions, thus underscoring what should be one of the region's main political priorities.

The only indicator in this transition on which Latin America scored higher than the EU was the one referring to the Financial Secrecy Index (S-FIS3). In Latin America there is less of a tendency towards financial secrecy compared to the EU where some countries are characterized by a notorious lack of banking transparency. A simple comparison serves as an illustration. Panama, the Latin American country included in this analysis with the highest Financial Secrecy Index, obtained a direct score of 474.49. Luxembourg on the other hand, the EU country with the worst score, came in at 803.77. But Cyprus, the Netherlands and Germany also had worse scores than Panama, which indicates that their banking systems contribute more to global tax evasion. It would be interesting to take a closer look at the figures and ascertain the extent to which the financial secrecy index of European countries is contributing to fiscal erosion in Latin American countries.

Ecological transition.

Smaller differences are found in the ecological transition. Although European Union country figures are better, the differences between the average scores of the two blocks are not as great as in other transitions. EU countries score higher on international environmental commitments, the establishment of protected areas and electricity production from renewable sources. In Latin America, however, water stress is lower.

This indicates that the European Union is more committed to proactively protecting the environment than Latin America, also considering that the European Union's greater investment and social intervention capacity enables more advanced tax systems. However, statements such as this must always be nuanced by the planetary impact and pressures analysis presented in the next section.

Graph 3.6.
Ecological transition indicators in the EU and Latin America.



Note: The values represented in the graph correspond to the average of the standardized transition indicator values for the countries in each regional group. For the complete denomination of the indicators for each code, see Table 5.1.

Source: own data.

Planetary impact and pressures.

The environmental cost of the European Union's development model is clearly higher. As the graph shows, the EU's results were worse on both indicators, i.e. it exerted a greater impact and pressures on the planet. This aligns with the information presented in Graph 3.1 which compared the two regions on each of the transitions.

This graph is unequivocal in revealing that, when it comes to planetary costs (the ecological cost of development borne by all of humanity), European Union countries are more responsible than those of Latin America. Or to put it more colloquially: we owe the world more.

Graph 3.7.
Planetary pressures index indicators in the EU and Latin America.



Note: In this graph, the values corresponding to planetary pressures appear multiplied by 100 to facilitate comparisons with the transitions. The values represented in the graph correspond to the average of the standardized transition indicator values for the countries in each regional group. For the complete denomination of the indicators for each code, see Table 5.1.

Source: own data.

3.3. Recommendations for relations between the European Union and CELAC.

Relations between the European Union and Latin America revolve around dialogue between ministers and heads of government. The mainstay of these talks is the so-called "EU-CELAC Summit" held every two years. It is important to understand that CELAC is not comparable to the European Union. Rather than being an international treaty-based organization, it is an informal forum of Latin American countries with very limited functions and competences of its own. CELAC, as such, was established in 2011, replacing another informal organization known as the Rio Group, to afford member countries greater representation. It is the only forum in which Latin American identity, independent of that of the United States, is expressed in the form of joint statements.

Hence, bi-regional dialogue had already been established before the creation of CELAC. In 1999 a bi-regional summit was held in Rio de Janeiro giving rise to a Bi-regional Strategic Association. This is the framework within which meetings have been held at ministerial level and between heads of state and government which, since 2013, have been called EU-CELAC Summits. The latest was held in 2021 via videoconference.

The Third Summit between the European Union and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States will be held in Brussels on 17 and 18 July. This Summit is a key milestone in relations between the two regions as cooperation between the member countries of the EU and CELAC will be based on the talks that take place there. The Summit is preceded by a ministerial-level meeting addressing some of the issues up for discussion[15].

[15] For the final press release of this ministerial meeting see: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/266758/EU-CELAC%20Press%20Release%20-%20FMM%20Buenos%20Aires_EN.pdf

Taking this context into account, following are some recommendations to transform cooperation relations between the two regions based on the results of the Coherence Index. We suggest that the PCSD could be useful in helping the two blocks move towards relations that make a positive contribution to the sustainability of the EU, Latin America, and the planet as a whole.

a. Both regions need to reformulate the general framework of their cooperation activities and direct them towards development models that are more compatible with the sustainability of life. One of the objectives of the Summit, as stated in the final ministerial summit press release, is to strengthen relations based on investment and trade. However, this focus is questionable from a coherence point of view. On the one hand, as has been pointed out several times already, the European Union has to structurally transform its development model and its production and consumption systems. This is incompatible with increasing the trade volumes. Quite the contrary. Data show that sustainable development in the European Union involves reducing planetary impact and pressures while maintaining acceptable levels of prosperity and social protection. Increasing the volume of goods imported from Latin American would have a negative impact in terms of ecological footprint and jeopardize the EU's eco-social transition. To give just one example, according to several reports[16], the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement currently being negotiated could increase meat exports from Latin America to the EU by about 15%. To reach that figure, 223,370 ha of land in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil, nearly four times the size of the Barcelona metropolitan area, would be needed each year. Hence, the consumption of meat by European citizens would have a negative impact on reducing planetary pressures.

[16] https://www.rosalux.eu/es/article/2124.una-aproximaci%C3%B3n-cr%C3%ADtica-al-acuerdo-ue-mercosur.html

b. Both the European Union and Latin America must further reduce their ecological footprint. As we have seen, serious imbalances exist in both regions as regards the planetary impact and pressures of their development models. While the European Union has worse numbers and therefore the moral obligation to reduce its footprint at a faster pace, Latin America also has a pressing need to transform. One of the outcomes of the EU-CELAC Summit in July 2023 should be a framework agreement between the two regions to accelerate the reduction of C02 emissions and establish joint eco-social transition policies. From this vantage point, dialogue merely circumscribed to non-binding commitments concerning already existing accords and to funding proposals for mitigation or adaptation would be considered a failure.

c. Cooperation between the EU and CELAC needs to move towards a new care-based social contract. There is a positive correlation between HDI and a high degree of planetary impact and pressures. This should prompt us to consider the need to make our welfare models more sustainable, and the field of cooperation between the European Union and Latin America is wide open in this respect. On the one hand, we must design a new social contract based on care and reproductive work. In the EU, this work should lead, among other outcomes, to the ratification of ILO Convention 189 and the protection of migrant workers. In Latin America, this new social contract entails improving social protection mechanisms for workers through better labour regulations.

d. Security and defence cooperation must gradually move towards democratization and demilitarization. Results in the area of democratic transition are divergent and heterogeneous in both regions. While the European Union does better on issues such as openness to civil society and civic space, its overall contribution is much more negative from the standpoint of global security and militarisation. In this transitional geopolitical context where attention is again focused on defence policies, this disparity between the two regions must be taken advantage so that the two regions can progress together. Regarding the current war in Ukraine, Brazil's president, Lula da Silva, offers an alternative to the EU's position. It is worth questioning the extent to which this is due to the different incentives each region has for global militarization. While in purely economic terms this militarisation would be positive for the EU owing to the importance of its arms industry, it would be less so for Latin America. From the perspective of policy coherence for sustainable development, it is important to engage in more substantive discussions on an alternative vision of global security policy much more focused on disarmament and collective security at both the upcoming EU-CELAC Summit in July 2023 and at subsequent summits. The European Union should commit, within the framework of international law, to gradually reducing the size of its arms industry and making a positive contribution to disarmament —especially nuclear disarmament.

e. Lastly, the European Union and CELAC should enhance their fiscal cooperation through a firmer European commitment to fiscal transparency and the strengthening of Latin American fiscal systems. The analysis shows that while tax margins and their impact on reducing inequality are high in the European Union, this is not the case in Latin America. In contrast, the European Union as a whole makes a greater negative contribution to global financial secrecy and this has a direct impact on tax evasion and money laundering. Therefore, one of the Summit's outcomes should be an agreement to address this issue. In Latin America, this translates into developing more robust tax systems that expand the fiscal margin, while in the European Union it entails raising financial transparency and having a greater impact on sustainable development.

4.
The new cooperation based on policy coherence

4.1. The relationship between the Coherence Index and cooperation.

At first glance, one might argue that none of the 52 indicators comprising the Coherence Index refers explicitly to cooperation policies. At least none of the indicators traditionally used to measure cooperation policy such as the amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA), the amount allocated for UN multilateral programmes, or funds earmarked for conversion programmes or debt cancellation. The reason is easy to explain: all measures forming part of the international cooperation system are based on differentiating between donor and recipient countries, and this acts as a de facto barrier to having useful indicators for all of the countries evaluated. Moreover, the coherence approach automatically dispels the notion that greater investment or effort in policies such as cooperation leads to a greater degree of coherence. We frequently observe that the policies that get funded are especially apt to cater to the interests of donor countries and, consequently, are fraught with contradictions regarding the effects and results of those policies[17]. This is certainly not to say that the opposite is true either, i.e. that the less effort made in cooperation, the greater the coherence. We are simply saying that there is no direct positive correlation between cooperation and coherence.

The relationship between cooperation and the policy coherence approach is, in fact, close, given that it is indeed the observations made while cooperation efforts are under way that point to the incoherent effects of other policies on the development processes that the cooperation policies are trying to promote. In the 1990s, the policy coherence approach for development simultaneously emerged alongside international aid system institutions. These institutions, guided by the donor countries, made an attempt to revamp cooperation practices to improve their quality and effectiveness, acknowledging their limitations and contradictions[18]. By so doing they were broadening the scope and complexity of their proposals beyond the limits of the cooperation system per se. The approval of the 2030 Agenda in the year 2015, initially intended as a

[17] Mélonio, T., Naudet, J. D., & Rioux, R. (2022). Official Development Assistance at the age of consequences. AFD Policy Papers, (11), 1-43. https://www.afd.fr/en/official-development-assistance-age-of-consequences-melonio-naudet-rioux

[18] 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and the ensuing process which, to a certain extent, culminated in the Busan Declaration (2011) on the new partnership for effective development.

continuation of the Millennium Agenda which had set the tone for cooperation policy for more than a decade, confirmed that the world needed more comprehensive, integrated and multidimensional guidelines than those that had been underpinning cooperation policy until then. This agenda incorporated goals related to ODA and the promotion of policy coherence.

The universality of the new 2030 Agenda —all countries should feel called upon owning to the comprehensiveness and multidimensionality of the proposal— establishes target 17.14, promoting policy coherence as a shared objective. If the proposal were broadened and specified in uniform, comparable terms, perhaps using indicator 17.14.1 proposed by UNSTAT to inform the incorporation of regulatory, political and instrumental mechanisms on policy coherence, this variable could be added in future versions of the Coherence Index. Today, it is still an isolated and not very comparable exercise due to the self-assessing nature of the indicator.

In 2012, the OECD decided to create a specific policy coherence unit, independently of other units working on sector specific policies, to address the development of the conceptual approach and its implementing methodology. Already sensing that the core of policy coherence would require a different perspective from that offered by sectoral policies, this was done to ensure that the approach was developed outside the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Thus, policy coherence is no longer an instrument of a specific policy but rather a comprehensive approach to policy impacts calling for the review of all policies based on these impacts. The idea then is to update policies based on the guidelines dictated by coherence. Hence, the Coherence Index offers relevant guidelines for cooperation policy, especially considering that the entire international cooperation system, and cooperation policies in particular, are undergoing an overhaul in terms of their discursive frameworks and political practices.

4.2. The transition from aid to a framework of harmonious global interaction.

The results of the Coherence Index can help us to dismiss some of the ideas that have supported cooperation policy in the past but that are no longer accepted or appropriate. International cooperation and its system, devised based on the concept of aid that assumes that some are able to help and that others need to be helped, runs counter to a world characterized by interdependencies and eco-dependence. The Coherence Index characterizes countries in such a way that the conventional division between developed countries and countries with development shortfalls no longer makes sense. Mainly it questions the actual existence of a sustainable development benchmark, i.e. a level of development that serves as an example and a guide to other countries. The "empty quadrant", as explained in the Chapter 1, is the best way to illustrate that all countries, without exception, must modify their development patterns to contribute to the sustainability of life on the planet.

The "empty quadrant": All countries, without exception, must modify their development patterns to contribute to the sustainability of life on the planet

Acceptance of this reality, unequivocally illustrated by the Coherence Index, itself serves as a guide for revamping cooperation policy to the extent that it needs to examine its principal motivation by calling into question its ultimate objective, the very idea of development aid. And this motivation is none other than responsibly contributing to a framework of global coexistence in the terms presented in the Index. In other words, advancing democratic, feminist, socioeconomic and ecological transitions and reducing planetary impact and pressures so as not to overwhelm the planetary cycles that sustain life. As already mentioned in previous chapters, this task does not allow us to extrapolate uniform, systematic programmes applicable to all territories and communities. Quite to the contrary, it requires specifying the strategic priorities of cooperation initiatives according to the individual situation of each country. This has direct consequences for the way in which cooperation policies are designed and formulated as they are still defined as complementary policies or depend on other national interests. In Spain, for instance, they are organically

and strategically dependent on foreign policy and the defence of Spain's interests abroad. Cooperation policies are still far from being designed based on the common interest defined by a radically democratic, feminist and sustainable framework for global coexistence. We therefore have cooperation policies limited by national interests that, in an increasingly interdependent world, stand in the way of the advancement of cosmopolitan programmes and policies addressing global challenges.

As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this report, a range of national interests, including but not limited to business internationalization, commercial interests, and border control, significantly interferes with cooperation policy.

The transitions defined by the Coherence Index and the reduction of planetary impact and pressures are common objectives for harmonious global interaction, which in the light of the material limitations imposed by the evidence of planetary cycles does not depend on the sum of individual countries. In other words, the actions that the Coherence Index can promote in the sphere of cooperation are not compatible with the idea that all countries can advance regardless of what the rest do. Instead, it encourages building political spaces for the democratic governance of global problems. And these political spaces, comprised of institutions and regulations, must be designed to resolve rather than encourage conflicts between national interests. For example, when the Coherence Index embraces the ratification of the convention on the rights of domestic workers (F-LEG7) in support of its feminist transition, it assumes that, if it is indeed ratified, countries like Spain will no longer benefit from the use of global care chains enabling them to meet demands for care coming from their ageing populations by exploiting women workers. The Coherence Index offers us concrete political guidelines to transform some of the trends and dynamics that generate the most inequalities, regardless of which countries may be benefiting from their privileged position.

A cooperation policy strategically oriented towards the transitions put forward in this tool can be enhanced, as it contributes to the democratic governance of global challenges. The Coherence Index and the dimensions it includes in its four transitions together with the indicators used to measure them are the ingredients for a coherent and solid strategic cooperation framework. This enhancement is complementary and focuses on some of the transformative elements that the 2030 Agenda's SDGs represent as a strategic horizon. To date, it has been incorporated more clearly in the discourse of cooperation policies than in actual practice. As a strategic guide for cooperation, the fundamental issue that the Coherence Index raises is the need to develop comprehensive action in congruence with the interactions among and between the transitions, which in turn must be coherent with the planetary pressures index. Therefore, revamping cooperation policy strategic frameworks should not be approached by adding new strategic objectives to traditional or consolidated ones, but instead by reviewing them from the new perspective that coherence offers for development processes.

The strategic framework for cooperation can be revamped and enhanced using the coherence approach, the basis of the Coherence Index, provided it is not considered yet another chapter added to the traditional geographical and sectoral priorities, but rather a comprehensive approach that informs and allows for a critical review of the entire strategy definition process. Contrary to what is widely assumed, the adoption of a comprehensive strategic framework built on policy coherence does not involve the lessening of importance, focus or interest in international cooperation, that is unless one insists on considering international cooperation as aid based on a North-South logic and relinquishes transformative international cooperation involving a sufficiently relevant global redistribution policy.

4.3. Towards coherent cooperation beyond ODA.

It is safe to say that "beyond aid" is the term that encapsulated many of the efforts to revamp cooperation policy frameworks for more than a decade[19]. In recent years, we have witnessed the emergence of cooperation actions by countries other than traditional donors, in some cases with approaches intentionally different from those established by the DAC. They have emerged as alternative and complementary modalities such as South-South cooperation, triangular cooperation, and cooperation of new emerging powers such as China and some Arab countries. In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, we also witnessed the emergence of new types of financing that pursue ties through development processes, for instance impact investing and reimbursable financial cooperation through investment mechanisms and blending. This expansion fit into the calls for a global alliance for development, institutionalized through SDG 17 of the 2030 Agenda. This partnership has made more progress in terms of aspirations and discourse than in establishing specific binding agreements enabling accountability mechanisms, distribution of differentiated responsibilities, or simply analysis of the impacts and results of the new forms of cooperation.

The political agenda raised by coherence aims to strengthen these aspects which are fundamental for building a global redistribution policy that effectively achieves transformative results amidst today's asymmetries. In other words, the Coherence Index enables us to put fundamental issues such as the tax agenda, the feminist agenda or the democratic agenda at the heart of cooperation policy. All of these agendas combine both national and global objectives and variables to provide an inclusive cosmopolitan perspective. These issues, vital to the transitions put forward by the Coherence Index, cannot remain limited to generic discursive appeals found only in the preambles and regulatory narratives of cooperation policies. Concrete strategic orientation proposals and specific objectives for international cooperation can be built based on the specific variables with which the tool establishes each of these dimensions.

[19] In his 2009 article *The end of ODA: death and rebirth of a global public policy* Severino describes the need to expand the political and analysis framework established by ODA due to the emergence of new actors, new interconnected challenges and new trends in the international financial framework. Yet this remains a contested issue and a topic of debate in the international community that has not yet managed to fully displace the analytical framework imposed by ODA, comprised of the set of standards developed by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee.

Deduced from each of these proposed dimensions and transitions are analysis criteria that can be applied to inform each and every one of the proposals made within the cooperation framework. This serves both to review bilateral and multilateral financing proposals and to inform and condition the operations that are proposed for financial cooperation and for any other of the modalities. The result is a powerful analytical framework with which to review, redirect, and establish conditions to revamp cooperation in order to broaden the scope of action and increase transformative capacity from the vantage point of advocacy and political participation.

4.4. Cooperation based on the protection of global public goods.

The concept of global public goods gleaned from this framework can be useful in redesigning cooperation policy considering the lessons learned from the Coherence Index. The term global good is an economic concept used to describe goods that can be enjoyed by all agents at the same time, free of charge (non-exclusive) and without depleting the good (no rivalry).

Traditionally, this concept has referred to very specific tangible goods. For example, air is a traditional public good because, under normal conditions, all people can enjoy it, free of charge and without depleting it. In other words, in principle, no one could claim to own the air with the intention of selling it because there would always be options to get air for free. Thus, from a market point of view, there is no incentive to produce public goods that would inevitably have to be produced or provided by non-market means (which does not necessarily mean public or without generating income).

Transferred to the field of international relations, the concept of global public good clarifies the fields in which cooperation is more rational than competition. In other words, all countries (and hence all humanity) would benefit from the provision of these global public goods at international level, and it would therefore make no sense to compete for them as they cannot be depleted.

Although there are multiple examples of global public goods based on the data proposed in the Coherence Index, we are putting forward three that could serve as a guide in redefining the cooperation policies of a country like Spain. We will then take this a step further by advancing three specific action frameworks for each of these goods, once again mainly based on the results.

Sustainability.

The first global public good that should serve as a track for reorienting public cooperation policy (and, according to the PCSD principle, all government policies) is sustainability. From the perspective of global public goods, the achievement of a sustainable world would, of course, mark a major step forward for all humanity. On the one hand because, by definition, making the development model sustainable means making it compatible with the development possibilities of the rest of humanity and future generations. Repeating the previous argument, all international relations agents have incentives to cooperate in making our world a more sustainable place. In fact, considering the eco-dependence inherent to planetary development processes, cooperation (as opposed to competition) stands as the only type of rational action in the field of sustainability.

There are several global processes that are already working on sustainability from a similar perspective as the one raised here. Based on sustainability's contradictory nature, the 2030 Agenda includes it as a common commitment of all governments. This entails the assumption that sustainability is non-exclusive and does not engender rivalry. However, this approach contrasts with other frameworks addressing sectoral issues and assumed by the Agenda itself, but which are closely related to environmental sustainability. For example, climate accords such as the Paris Agreement have tended to combine setting common goals with competitive practices based on market mechanisms to achieve them. Thus, an attempt has been made to convert climate change mitigation into an issue reducible to the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions market.

What this institutional design has brought about, however, is a more unsustainable world. Currently, the most ambitious emissions market on the planet is the one designed within the EU under Directive 2003/87/EC regulating emissions markets for many polluting activities. Despite being in operation for nearly two decades, the Coherence Index clearly shows us that no EU member state has achieved acceptable CO2 emissions results (indicator ECO-IMP2. Carbon dioxide emissions in terms of consumption, metric tonnes per person). Yet member states vary significantly on this variable. Luxembourg, the EU's biggest CO2 per capita polluter, emits 32.44 metric tons per year. On the other end of the spectrum, Hungary emits five times less, approximately 5.9 metric tonnes. Viewing sustainability as a global public good would change the way we currently approach climate agreements.

Security and international peace.

International peace and security is another global public good on which cooperation policy is built. Viewing it as a global public good forces us to realize that the only way to achieve lasting peace is through collective security mechanisms to manage conflict.

There are several examples of collective security models in the history of international relations that viewed peace and security as a public good and not as a competitive issue. The idea of the United Nations can be interpreted as an attempt to materialise this concept in an institutional design. Although we are all aware of the power imbalances between members of the UN Security Council, the very existence of a Security Council in which States debate on this issue is already a way of trying to overcome a solely competitive vision of global security. Another historical example is the direct predecessor of the United Nations, the League of Nations, where war was theoretically banned as an option.

Thus, conceiving security as a global public good implies working in at least two spheres. First, in reducing the structural causes of insecurity. Reinforcing the concept of human security

as a strategic part of defence policies would imply focusing mainly on this area. But also, this should go together with strengthening international law and multilateral institutions as a propitious environment for conflict resolution including disarmament policies.

While examples stand in history of peace and security being addressed through global institutions in line with the logic of global public goods, in recent years the trend has unfortunately been moving in the opposite direction. According to the report by the Stockholm Institute for Peace Studies, states are currently reaching levels of military spending on a par with those of the Cold War[20]. The increase is being led by European Union countries in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

This is consistent with the data presented in the Coherence Index which gives some EU countries a very low score in the militarization dimension under democratic transition. Countries like Spain, Italy and France scored very poorly owing to the weight of their arms industries in the current process of global militarization.

Equality.

The last of the global public goods that could be used to develop a new international cooperation policy is equality/equity. This public good reflects a minimum threshold of justice and social protection, ensured through public policy, enabling all people to live in dignity with the possibility of full development.

This definition dovetails perfectly with the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR). Signed in 1976, this covenant and its different protocols call on states to commit to employ maximum available resources to ensure these rights.

Understanding equality as a global public good puts us face to face with one of the key issues of our time: inequality. All public cooperation policies targeting global coexistence must address inequality as a major challenge.

[20] https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-high-european-spending-surges

The Coherence Index sheds light on some of the dynamics that allow or enable income inequality within states and, in parallel, helps identify practices that tend to perpetuate inequalities, not only in the economic sphere but also in terms of access to basic services and gender gaps. The Financial Secrecy Index stands as a good example. According to European Commission figures, in 2021, 1.7 trillion euros, a sum of money from EU countries comparable to the GDP of Italy, was found in tax havens[21]. This money remained hidden from national authorities thanks to the persistence of financial secrecy practices that facilitate tax avoidance and prevent governments from complying with their fiscal obligation to ensure the use of maximum available resources as required under the ESCR Covenant.

4.5. How to act: shifting from a sectoral and geographical focus to strategic areas.

Following this conceptual presentation on global public goods, we will conclude this section with a potential strategic framework of action for development cooperation. This framework, which we will refer to as strategic areas, seeks to overcome the traditional vision of priority sectors and countries, which we believe remains anchored in an outdated conception of contemporary development dynamics, and replace it with another vision designed to protect global public goods.

It is important to first point out two things. These strategic areas are designed based on the notion of global public goods described above. There are other possibilities that, in any case, should always arise from a collective political process rather than from research work. Also, they are conceived as strategic areas for a country like Spain, taking account of its indicators and results for the different variables. This section does not intend to provide a systematic analysis, but simply underscore some examples of what direction a public cooperation policy based on policy coherence for development should take.

[21] European Commission, Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union (2021). *Monitoring the amount of wealth hidden by individuals in international financial centres and impact of recent internationally agreed standards on tax transparency on the fight against tax evasion – Final report,* Publications Office. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0f2b8b13-f65f-11eb-9037-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

Strategic area: global eco-social transition.

A global eco-social transition is the first strategic area towards which cooperation action should be reoriented. The aim is to protect sustainability viewed as a global public good.

To achieve this, it is urgent to undertake a global eco-social transition that establishes a new sort of relationship with the planet based on acknowledgement of our eco-dependencies. While building this new model, cooperation policies should focus on drawing up large binding international frameworks to reduce CO2 emissions and our ecological footprint adapted to the principle of shared but differentiated responsibilities (precisely the indicators included in our index that, in turn, form the planetary pressures index).

These international frameworks would have two lines of action. On the one hand, for the countries exerting the greatest impact and global pressures, this would necessarily involve a transformation of their development model by no longer engaging in certain activities (such as intensive agriculture for export purposes, private transport and use of fossil fuels, to cite just three examples). In addition, rethinking these development models should also translate into putting care work at their heart. Here, the data that the Coherence Index offers on the feminist transition can serve as a benchmark to work towards. Care needs to be distributed fairly between men and women and should also be given an increasingly prominent position in public policy and economic strategy. To put it in more graphic terms, the aim would be to produce fewer cars and build more nursery schools.

In the field of cooperation, these frameworks should enable countries currently facing greater challenges in terms of transitions, but exerting minor ecological impact, to move forward. Cooperation policy should help repair the historical ecological debt Western countries have generated in recent centuries with the rest of the planet. As limiting some of the main energy sources (such as fossil fuels) in countries in the South is inevitable, for the global eco-social transition to be

feasible we urgently need to support other sources of resources. This could be a way to reconsider international development financing and, above all, to establish a new international order favouring a fair eco-social transition.

We must urgently reduce and/or modify international trade and build self-centred economies at local and regional level

Hence, global trade policies urgently need to be reformed. A large proportion of the per capita ecological impact and pressures revealed by the Coherence Index has to do with the survival of economies based on export-oriented production. That makes a new global trade policy displacing the neoliberal thinking on which the current model was built unavoidable. From the perspective of sustainability, we must urgently reduce and/or modify international trade and build self-centred economies at local and regional level, at least for the most basic products.

Strategic area: peace and disarmament.

Peace is the second strategic area that should be used to build a cooperation policy based on coherence. The aim here is to counteract the previously mentioned dynamics of global militarization through active disarmament policies and negotiated conflict resolution.

In cooperation, the mechanism could resemble the one indicated above, and the Coherence Index can help pave the way. As indicated in the previous chapter comparing the EU and Latin America, it is interesting to observe how the European Union fares better in terms of democratic transition, such as the implementation of resolution 1325 on participation in post-conflict peace and reconstruction processes with a feminist perspective, while it is far behind in terms of arms exports or military spending as a percentage of GDP. Based on this diagnosis, one could imagine international frameworks that include binding commitments for both regions with a view to improving both indicators.

EU countries, including Spain, should commit to reducing arms exports and to making a positive contribution to global disarmament initiatives, such as nuclear disarmament.

In today's global context evolving towards a new cold war dynamic, this type of initiative would also have a positive impact on the peaceful resolution of conflicts based on multilateralism, which is currently in crisis. It is also important to include specific commitments to reduce violence against women and active policies to reduce gender inequality. This should be done not only for regulatory reasons, but also because of the positive structural consequences that such a reduction would entail.

Strategic area: inequality and global taxation.

Lastly, a possible third strategic area would address the sphere of inequality and global taxation. A clear link exists between the two. In the Coherence Index, this link is reflected through indicator S-FIS3 (Variation of the Gini Index before and after taxes). The ability of the tax system to meet its wealth redistribution goals is critical in achieving a global model of social justice.

Three lines of work should be tackled within this strategic area. First, specific work at an international level should be done to establish global tax regulations. There are already specific proposals, such as the potential agreement to establish a global corporate tax of 15% or, more ambitiously, to build an international tax organization under the United Nations to serve as the basis for this initiative. Second, from a European perspective, serious efforts must be made to end tax evasion and tax havens. An in-depth analysis of international economic flows reveals the official development aid mirage. Much more capital and resources come from so-called "developing countries" rather than in the opposite direction. Coherence based cooperation must accept this fact and work to reverse it. The Financial Secrecy Index may be useful in accomplishing this. Third, taxation offers a broad field of what we could call technical cooperation between governments that could form part of these international frameworks.

4.6. Conclusion: policy coherence for sustainable development as a challenge for cooperation.

In this section we have analysed the limits of traditional development cooperation considering PCSD principles and some of the data provided by the Coherence Index. Over and above specific proposals, we have tried to convey the urgent need for development cooperation to transform its theoretical and political conceptions and work tools to meet the challenges posed by the conditions surrounding sustainable development today.

Much of this work is already under way. The 2030 Agenda is probably the best example of this having rejected proposals to continue with an agenda focused solely on cooperation objectives as a sectoral policy and instead proposed a paradigmatic review based on the multisectoral and comprehensive nature that all policies must have to work coherently to bring about change. However, the changes brought by the 2030 Agenda in terms of cooperation discourse have had very little practical impact on the ground. A similar phenomenon has occurred with the principle of policy coherence for development. Practically all cooperation agents have taken the ideas on board, but practical implications have been few and far between. Real change requires, inter alia, a new multilateral cooperation strategy to support bilateral actions defined in strategic areas, guiding Spanish cooperation towards the goal of clearly contributing to the governance of global public goods.

However, that is not what reading the recently passed Law 1/2023 on Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Global Solidarity conveys. Although the first part if this act presents a novel and contemporary vision of development problems, once it gets into the specifics of cooperation instruments and modalities, one gets the ominous feeling of deja vu. Changing cooperation policy is not about changing language but about forcing ourselves to imagine doing things differently and taking the risk that entails. We hope that the Coherence Index contributes to furnishing the elements needed to provide more stable footing for this journey.

In any case, we should not expect automatic technical responses that, when applied, will *ipso facto* contribute to the changes required by a new cooperation policy. If we acknowledge that we are living in a period of paradigm change, as borne out by the results of the Coherence Index, we must also acknowledge that alternative paradigms are being built. This makes it vital for us to generate tools and spaces for political dialogue that encourage us to more effectively reflect together on alternatives to development or alternative development. It is quite possible to know what things we should stop doing even though we do not yet have a crystal-clear view of what to do instead and how to do it.

The Coherence Index will be very helpful in progressively incorporating this deeper reflection on the effects and impacts that public policies, over and above cooperation policy, have in all territories and on real individuals on the ground. In practical terms the policy coherence approach, as an initial action, aims to detect, reveal and better understand interactions between dimensions, territories and generations with a view to reorienting public policy, promoting positive interactions and eliminating negative ones. This chapter of the report has developed some of the conclusions offered by an analysis of the Coherence Index results in order to begin this process of reorienting cooperation policy. Surely there are many more possible analyses based on this tool whose potential for researchers and political and social actors is yet to be realized.

5.
The tool

5.1. The Coherence Index (Indico).

The Coherence Index is an indicator designed to explore, analyse, and compare countries' policy coherence with sustainable development.

According to the index, policies coherent with sustainable development put the well-being of people (human development approach) and the sustainability of the planet (sustainable development approach) at the centre, consider the effects of policies within and outside the borders of the country that applies them (cosmopolitan approach), promote gender equality (feminist perspective) and uphold human rights for all people (human rights approach).

The Coherence Index approaches

The Coherence Index is based on a broad and transformative development approach, starting with five interrelated approaches that expand and complement one other[22]:

Human development. According to the Coherence Index, policies coherent with sustainable development are aimed at expanding capabilites. Thus, the index includes indicators to assess the extent to which countries implement public policies that put people's well-being at the centre.

Sustainable development. The Coherence Index is based on the recognition that people are eco-dependent beings and that public policies must consider the biophysical limits of the planet we inhabit. Hence, in its analysis of policies (economic, social, environmental, and political), the index explores four dimensions of sustainable development and their interactions.

Cosmopolitan development. In a globalized and interdependent world, countries' responsibilities cannot be limited solely to the territory within their geopolitical borders. From the PCSD standpoint taken by the Coherence Index, public policies must be designed and implemented with due consideration for their effects on other territories and people.

Gender approach. No public policy is gender neutral. For that reason, the Coherence Index is designed to assess the extent to which public policies guarantee women's rights while combating inequality and ensuring that they do not contribute to gender inequality.

Human rights approach. In the Coherence Index, people are entitled to rights. This implies, among other things, that countries need robust institutions that protect and safeguard these rights for the entire population, free from all discrimination, with mechanisms that facilitate citizens' empowerment and participation in developing public policies incorporating transparent and effective accountability systems.

[22] Martínez Osés P. J., Gil Payno M.L., Martínez I., Millán N., Ospina S., Medina J., Sanabria A., García H. (2016). *2016 PCDI: Another way to grow.* Editorial Plataforma 2015 y más.

In this third and revamped version based on these approaches, the Coherence Index rests upon two main pillars: **transitions and planetary pressures.**

The **transitions** pillar represents the major changes that public policies coherent with sustainable development must promote to evolve towards other fair and sustainable ways of life, organization, and social reproduction. These changes are broken down into four interrelated transitions that the following aspects of the PCSD evaluate:

Democratic transition: the extent to which countries are committed to public policies designed to build democratic and peaceful societies that safeguard and protect (civil and political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental) human rights, and freedom of association, assembly and the right to protest (civic space).

Feminist transition: the extent to which countries pursue public policies that safeguard women's rights, promote equality between men and women and recognize and respect diversity, and contribute to a new social organization that revives and places caregiving in its centre.

Socio-economic transition: the extent to which countries promote strong welfare states with public services and social protection that safeguards social rights for all, incorporating redistributive fiscal and social policies that reduce the many existing inequalities.

Ecological transition: the extent to which countries are striving to protect the environment and are committed to renewable energy.

Each transition, in turn, is broken down into several dimensions that reflect the main priority areas in which progress needs to be made in the transformation process towards public policies coherent with sustainable development, which are evaluated by a set of 50 indicators (Table 5. 1).

The **planetary pressures** pillar measures the impact and ecological pressures that countries exert on the planet and is built on two indicators: material footprint per capita and CO2 emissions per capita, both in terms of consumption, with a view to incorporating the ecological pressures that countries put on other territories via globalization in production and international trade.

Indicators and sources.

The 2023 Coherence Index is built on the 52 indicators shown in Table 5. 1.: 50 indicators evaluate the 13 dimensions of the four transitions, and the remaining 2 are designed for the planetary pressures index.

Half of these 52 indicators assess elements related to the design and direct results of certain public policy measures, while the other half measure final results arising from the interaction of different public policies also potentially influenced by contextual factors or those not exclusively controlled by governments. Moreover, 31 of these 52 indicators (60%) are designed to assess the extent to which public policies incorporate a feminist perspective, a major improvement over previous edition. Of these 31 indicators, 21 measure aspects related to the status of women and gender gaps and 10 evaluate more general aspects that significantly affect their quality of life such as access to water and electricity, among others.

As in previous editions, information is mostly drawn from official sources, although statistical information from unofficial organizations and institutions is also used to evaluate aspects of public policies pertinent to the PCSD for which official sources do not provide information.

The Coherence Index seeks to provide information on how countries are currently performing in terms of PCSD. However, statistics take time to publish and public policy shifts do not have an immediate impact on the data. This means that it is not always possible to fully show the most recent PCSD performance of the countries analysed. We should note that the 2023 Coherence Index's statistical information basically reflects the period between 2019 and 2022.

Countries.

Through 52 indicators, the Coherence Index evaluates the behaviours of 153 countries in terms of their policy coherence for sustainable development

Through 52 indicators, the Coherence Index evaluates the behaviours of 153 countries in terms of their policy coherence for sustainable development.

The Coherence Index assesses 153 countries, i.e. all those for which sufficient data is available for at least 80% of the indicators. According to the World Bank's regional classification, 46 countries belong to the Europe and Central Asia region, 38 to Sub-Saharan Africa, 25 to Latin America and the Caribbean, 18 to East Asia and Pacific, 18 to East and North Africa, 6 to South Asia and 2 to North America. Regarding income level, 48 are high income countries, 40 are upper-middle-income, 42 are lower-middle-income and 22 are low-income. As for human development, 62 countries have a very high HDI, 32 high, 31 medium and 28 low[23].

[23] The classification of countries by geographical area, income and HDI is available in the 2023 Indico methodology document.

Table 5.1. 2023 Coherence Index indicators and sources.

(Continued on pages. 113, 114 and 115)

	DIMENSION	CODE	INDICATOR	SOURCE
Democratic	Civil society and transparency	D-SC1	Civicus Monitor	CIVICUS
		D-SC2	Open government index	World Justisce Project (WJP)
	Political commitment to human rights and justice	D-DDHH1	Abolition of the death penalty	Amnesty International
		D-DDHH2	Ratification of UN Human Rights treaties	United Nations Human Rights. Office of the High Commissioner
		D-DDHH3	Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	UN Treaty Collection
		D-DDHH4	Ratification of Fundamental ILO Conventions	International Labour Organization (ILO)
		D-DDHH5	Participation in international weapons treaties and conventions	UN Treaty Collection
		D-DDHH6	Women's access to justice	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
		D-DDHH7	Existence of an action plan to implement Resolution UNSCR 1325	Security Women
	Militarization	D-MILIT1	Military spending (% GDP)	World Bank
		D-MILIT2	Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities	Vision of Humanity Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
		D-MILIT3	Exports and imports of the main conventional weapons (TIV million constant dollars per 100,000 inhabitants)	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Table 5.1.
(Continuation)

	DIMENSION	CODE	INDICATOR	SOURCE
Feminist	Legal and regulatory framework	F-LEG1	Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and its optional protocol	UN Treaty Collection
		F-LEG2	Legislation on violence against women	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
		F-LEG3	Abortion legislation	Center for Reproductive Rights
		F-LEG4	Legislation on sexual orientation	ILGA World – the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association
		F-LEG5	Legal recognition of LGTBI families	ILGA World – the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association
		F-LEG6	The law requires equal pay for women and men for work of equal value	World Bank
		F-LEG7	Ratification of the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (C-189)	International Labour Organization (ILO)
		F-LEG8	Women and men have equal legal rights and opportunities in the workplace	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
		F-LEG9	Women and men have equal rights as citizens and the ability to exercise those rights	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
	Social situation of women	F-SOC1	Percentage of women who have suffered physical or sexual violence at the hands of their partner	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
		F-SOC2	Average number of years of education (women)	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
		F-SOC3	Percentage of population with at least a secondary education (women)	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
		F-SOC4	Maternal mortality rate	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
		F-SOC5	Adolescent birth rate	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
	Political participation	F-POL1	Seats occupied by women in National Parliaments (%)	World Bank
		F-POL2	Women in ministerial positions (%)	World Bank
	Gender gaps	F-BRECH1	Gender gap in labour force participation rates (% men -% women)	International Labour Organization (ILO)
		F-BRECH2	Account holders in financial institutions or mobile money service providers (% male - %female)	World Bank
		F-BRECH3	Average years of education: Difference between men and women (%)	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Table 5.1.
(Continuation)

	DIMENSION	CODE	INDICATOR	SOURCE
Socio-economic	Social situation	S-SOC1	Completion rate of upper secondary education	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
		S-SOC2	Healthy life expectancy at birth (years)	World Health Organization
		S-SOC3	Number of physicians per 10,000 inhabitants	World Health Organization
		S-SOC4	Population exposed to levels exceeding WHO reference value for PM2.5 (%)	World Bank
		S-SOC5	Public spending on social protection (% GDP)	International Labour Organization (ILO)
		S-SOC6	Population covered by at least one social protection benefit (%)	UN Statistics - SDG Indicator Database
	Employment	S-EMP1	Unemployment rate	International Labour Organization (ILO)
		S-EMP2	Vulnerable employment (% of total employment)	World Bank
	Taxation	S-FIS1	Government revenue (% GDP)	International Monetary Fund (IMF)
		S-FIS2	Variation rate of the Gini Index before and after taxes and transfers (%)	Harvard Dataverse
		S-FIS3	Financial Secrecy Index	Tax Justice Network
	Basic services	S-SSBB1	Access to electricity (% of population)	World Bank
		S-SSBB2	Internet users (per 100 people)	World Bank
		S-SSBB3	Improved water sources, rural sector (% of the population with access)	World Bank
	Inequality	S-DESIG1	Palma Index	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Table 5.1.
(Continuation)

	DIMENSION	CODE	INDICATOR	SOURCE
Ecological	Ecological	ECO1	Participation in international agreements on the environment	UN Statistics - SDG Indicator Database
		ECO2	Terrestrial and marine protected areas (% of total area)	World Bank
		ECO3	Water stress level: Freshwater extraction as a proportion of available freshwater resources	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
		ECO4	Electricity generation using renewables (excluding hydropower)	International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)

	CODE	INDICATOR	SOURCE
Planetary pressures index	ECO-IMP1	Material footprint per capita (Consumption)	United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
	ECO-IMP2	Carbon dioxide emissions in terms of consumption (metric tonnes per person)	Eora MRIO database

Source: own data.

Interpreting the Coherence Index.

The Coherence Index ranges from 0 (worst score) to 100 (best score). Transition and dimension scores are also on a scale of 0 to 100 where 0 is the worst score and 100 is the best.

The planetary pressures index ranges from 0 to 1. The closer the value is to 1, the lower the pressures that countries exert on the planet.

Thus, according to the Coherence Index calculation system, a score of 100 would be awarded to a country with the highest marks in both indicators, i.e. a score of 100 in "transitions" and a score of 1 in the "planetary pressures index".

5.2. How it was built.

The 2023 Coherence Index is the fruit of an intense conceptual and methodological review of the tool. As a result of this process, the structure of the Coherence Index differs from that of previous editions. Its set of indicators has been modified significantly as has its calculation method. Following is a summary of the most important elements used to build the tool[24].

Selecting the indicators.

The indicators were selected by combining a theoretical-conceptual analysis of the suitability of the indicators according to the initial approach of the Coherence Index and statistical methods and criteria. This involved a participatory analysis process verified with representatives of the organizations pioneering the tool (The Spanish Development NGO Platform, Futuro en Común, and the Spanish Network of Development Studies (REEDES)), other environmental and social organizations advocating for human rights, and academia and experts in the building of composite indicators.

[24] Detailed information on how the tool was built is available on the Indico website: https://www.indicedecoherencia.org/en/open-data

Calculating the Coherence Index.

Having selected the indicators, the Coherence Index is calculated in five steps[25]:

Step 1.

Each dimension is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the indicators comprising it once standardized and missing values have been imputed[26].

$$Ip_j = \sum_{1}^{N} \frac{X_i}{N}$$

Step 2.

Each transition is calculated as the geometric mean of the dimensions comprising it. This does not allow for completely offsetting good scores on one dimension with poor scores on others.

$$It_k = \left(\prod_{j=1}^{n} Ip_j \right)^{\frac{1}{n}} = \sqrt[n]{Ip_1 \cdot Ip_2 \cdots Ip_j}$$

Step 3.

The aggregate of transitions is calculated as the geometric mean of the transitions (democratic, feminist, socio-economic and ecological). As with the dimensions, this does not allow for completely offsetting good scores on one transition with poor scores on others.

$$T = \sqrt[4]{It_{DEM} \cdot It_{FEM} \cdot It_{SOCIECO} \cdot It_{ECO}}$$

[25] The 2023 Coherence Index calculation method is based on the HDI adjusted for planetary pressuress. For more information on the methodology underpinning the 2023 Coherence Index see: https://www.indicedecoherencia.org/en/open-data

[26] Standardisation is done using the Min-max method and missing data imputation by means of a "nearest neighbours" algorithm. For more information, see: https://www.indicedecoherencia.org/en/open-data

Step 4.

The planetary pressures index is the arithmetic mean of the two indicators comprising it once they have been standardised and the missing data has been imputed: the material footprint per capita and CO2 emissions per capita, both in terms of consumption[27]. The direction of the indicators is adjusted as part of the standardisation process such that the greater the material footprint and emissions, the greater the pressures on the planet and the closer the index moves towards 0. The value of this index ranges from 0 (worst score) to 1 (best score).

$$Ipp = \frac{(ECO\text{-}IMP1 + ECO\text{-}IMP2)/2}{100}$$

Step 5.

The Coherence Index is calculated by multiplying the aggregate of the transitions by the planetary pressures index. The higher the ecological pressures that countries exert on the planet, the higher the planetary pressures rate and, therefore, the lower the penalty they receive.

$$Indico = T * Ipp$$

As for weighting, the balanced weighting criterion has been maintained at all instances of Coherence Index aggregation (indicators, dimensions, transitions and planetary pressures index).

[27] This entails taking international trade into account, i.e. the material footprint and emissions associated with imports are included while those for exports are excluded.

Figure 5.1. Construction of the 2023 Coherence Index.



Source: own data.

6.
Annexes

Annex 1. Scorecard: the dimensions.

0 - 20	20 - 40	40 - 60	60 - 80	80 - 90	>90
(worst score)					(best score)

D	Democratic transition	**F**	Feminist transition	**S**	Socio-economic transition
SC	Civil society and transparency	**LEG**	Legal and regulatory framework	**SOC**	Social situation
DDHH	Political commitment to human rights and justice	**SOC**	Social situation of women	**EMP**	Employment
MILIT	Militarization	**POL**	Political participation	**FIS**	Taxation
		BRECH	Gender gaps	**SSBB**	Basic services
				DESIG	Inequality
				ECO	Ecological transition

Countries	D			F				S					ECO
	SC	DDHH	MILIT	LEG	SOC	POL	BRECH	SOC	EMP	FIS	SSBB	DESIG	
Afghanistan	🔴	🟠	🟡	🔴	🔴	🔴	🟠	⚫	🔴	🟠	🟠	🟡	🔴
Albania	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟠	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟠	🟠	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟠
Algeria	🔴	🔴	🔴	🔴	🟡	🔴	🔴	🔴	🟡	🟠	🟡	🟢	🔴
Angola	🔴	🟡	🟢	🟠	🔴	🟡	🟡	⚫	🟠	🟠	🔴	🔴	🟠
Argentina	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟡	🟡	🟡	🟢	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟠
Armenia	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟠	🟢	🔴	🟡	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟠
Australia	🟢	🟢	🟠	🟡	🟢	🟠	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟡
Austria	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟡
Azerbaijan	⚫	🟡	🟠	🔴	🟢	⚫	🟢	🔴	🟡	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟠
Bahamas	🟠	🔴	🟢	🔴	🟢	🔴	🟢	🔴	🟡	🔴	🟢	🟢	🟠
Bahrain	⚫	⚫	🟡	🔴	🟢	⚫	🟡	🟠	🟢	🟠	🟢	🟡	🔴
Bangladesh	🔴	🟡	🟡	🔴	🟠	🔴	🟠	⚫	🟡	🟠	🟡	🟢	🟠
Belarus	⚫	🔴	🟡	🟠	🟢	🟠	🟢	🟠	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟠
Belgium	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟡
Belize	🟠	🟡	🟢	🔴	🟡	🔴	🟡	🔴	🟡	🟠	🟢	🟠	🟡
Benin	🔴	🟢	🟢	🟠	🔴	🔴	🟠	⚫	🟠	🟠	🔴	🟠	🟠
Bolivia	🟠	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟠	🟡	🟡	🔴	🟠	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟡
Bosnia and Herzegovina	🟠	🟢	🟢	🟠	🟢	🟠	🟠	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟠
Botswana	🟠	🟠	🟢	🔴	🟡	🔴	🟢	⚫	🟠	🟡	🟡	🔴	🟠
Brasil	🟠	🟢	🟡	🟡	🟡	🔴	🟢	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟢	🟠	🟡
Brunei	🔴	⚫	🟡	⚫	🟡	⚫	🟢	🟠	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟠
Bulgaria	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟠	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟠	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟡
Burkina Faso	🟠	🟢	🟢	🔴	🔴	🔴	🟠	⚫	🟠	🟠	🔴	🟢	🟠
Burundi	⚫	🟡	🟢	🔴	🔴	🟡	🟡	⚫	🟠	🟠	🔴	🟡	🔴
Cambodia	⚫	🟡	🟢	🟠	🟠	🔴	🟡	⚫	🟡	🟠	🟡	🟡	🟠
Cameroon	⚫	🟡	🟢	🔴	🔴	🟠	🟡	⚫	🟠	🟠	🟠	🟠	🟠
Canada	🟢	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟢	🟢	🟠

Countries	D			F				S					ECO
	SC	DDHH	MILIT	LEG	SOC	POL	BRECH	SOC	EMP	FIS	SSBB	DESIG	
Cape Verde													
Central African Republic													
Chad													
Chile													
China													
Colombia													
Congo (Dem. Rep.)													
Congo (Rep.)													
Costa Rica													
Croatia													
Cuba													
Cyprus													
Czechia													
Denmark													
Dominican Republic													
Ecuador													
Egypt													
El Salvador													
Estonia													
Ethiopia													
Fiji													
Finland													
France													
Gambia													
Georgia													
Germany													
Ghana													
Greece													
Guatemala													
Guinea													
Guyana													
Haití													
Honduras													
Hungary													
Iceland													
India													
Indonesia													
Iran													

Countries	D			F				S					ECO
	SC	DDHH	MILIT	LEG	SOC	POL	BRECH	SOC	EMP	FIS	SSBB	DESIG	
Iraq													
Ireland													
Israel													
Italy													
Ivory Coast													
Jamaica													
Japan													
Jordan													
Kazakhstan													
Kenya													
Kuwait													
Kyrgyzstan													
Laos													
Latvia													
Lebanon													
Lesotho													
Liberia													
Lithuania													
Luxembourg													
Madagascar													
Malawi													
Malaysia													
Mali													
Malta													
Mauritania													
Mauritius													
Mexico													
Moldavia													
Mongolia													
Montenegro													
Morocco													
Mozambique													
Myanmar													
Namibia													
Nepal													
Netherlands													
New Zealand													
Nicaragua													

Countries	D			F				S					ECO
	SC	DDHH	MILIT	LEG	SOC	POL	BRECH	SOC	EMP	FIS	SSBB	DESIG	
Niger													
Nigeria													
Northern Macedonia													
Norway													
Oman													
Pakistan													
Panama													
Papua New Guinea													
Paraguay													
Peru													
Philippines													
Poland													
Portugal													
Qatar													
Romania													
Russia													
Rwanda													
Saudi Arabia													
Senegal													
Serbia													
Sierra Leone													
Singapore													
Slovakia													
Slovenia													
South Africa													
South Korea													
Spain													
Sri Lanka													
Sudan													
Sweden													
Switzerland													
Syria													
Tanzania													
Thailand													
Togo													
Trinidad and Tobago													
Tunisia													
Turkey													

Countries	D			F				S					ECO
	SC	DDHH	MILIT	LEG	SOC	POL	BRECH	SOC	EMP	FIS	SSBB	DESIG	
Uganda													
Ukraine													
United Arab Emirates													
United Kingdom													
United States													
Uruguay													
Uzbekistan													
Venezuela													
Vietnam													
Yemen													
Zambia													
Zimbabwe													

Source: own data.

Annex 2. Countries evaluated in Indico.

ISO3	NAME	REGION WORLD BANK (2022)	INCOME WORLD BANK (2022)	HDI 2021/22
AFG	Afghanistan	South Asia	Low income	Low HDI
ALB	Albania	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	High HDI
DZA	Algeria	Middle East and North Africa	Lower middle income	High HDI
AGO	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
ARG	Argentina	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
ARM	Armenia	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	High HDI
AUS	Australia	East Asia and Pacific	High income	Very high HDI
AUT	Austria	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
AZE	Azerbaijan	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	High HDI
BHS	Bahamas	Latin America and the Caribbean	High income	Very high HDI
BHR	Bahrain	Middle East and North Africa	High income	Very high HDI
BGD	Bangladesh	South Asia	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
BLR	Belarus	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
BEL	Belgium	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
BLZ	Belize	Latin America and the Caribbean	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
BEN	Benin	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Low HDI
BOL	Bolivia	Latin America and the Caribbean	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	High HDI
BWA	Botswana	Sub-Saharan Africa	Upper middle income	Medium HDI
BRA	Brazil	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	High HDI
BRN	Brunei	East Asia and Pacific	High income	Very high HDI
BGR	Bulgaria	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	High HDI
BFA	Burkina Faso	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
BDI	Burundi	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
KHM	Cambodia	East Asia and Pacific	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
CMR	Cameroon	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
CAN	Canada	North America	High income	Very high HDI
CPV	Cape Verde	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
CAF	Central African Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
TCD	Chad	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
CHL	Chile	Latin America and the Caribbean	High income	Very high HDI
CHN	China	East Asia and Pacific	Upper middle income	High HDI
COL	Colombia	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	High HDI

ISO3	NAME	REGION WORLD BANK (2022)	INCOME WORLD BANK (2022)	HDI 2021/22
COD	Congo (Dem. Rep.)	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
COG	Congo (Rep.)	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
CRI	Costa Rica	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
HRV	Croatia	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
CUB	Cuba	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	High HDI
CYP	Cyprus	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
CZE	Czechia	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
DNK	Denmark	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
DOM	Dominican Republic	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	High HDI
ECU	Ecuador	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	High HDI
EGY	Egypt	Middle East and North Africa	Lower middle income	High HDI
SLV	El Salvador	Latin America and the Caribbean	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
EST	Estonia	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
ETH	Ethiopia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
FJI	Fiji	East Asia and Pacific	Upper middle income	High HDI
FIN	Finland	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
FRA	France	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
GMB	Gambia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
GEO	Georgia	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
DEU	Germany	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
GHA	Ghana	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
GRC	Greece	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
GTM	Guatemala	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	Medium HDI
GIN	Guinea	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
GUY	Guyana	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	High HDI
HTI	Haiti	Latin America and the Caribbean	Lower middle income	Low HDI
HND	Honduras	Latin America and the Caribbean	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
UN	Hungary	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
ISL	Iceland	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
IND	India	South Asia	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
IDN	Indonesia	East Asia and Pacific	Lower middle income	High HDI
IRN	Iran	Middle East and North Africa	Lower middle income	High HDI
IRQ	Iraq	Middle East and North Africa	Upper middle income	Medium HDI
IRL	Ireland	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI

ISO3	NAME	REGION WORLD BANK (2022)	INCOME WORLD BANK (2022)	HDI 2021/22
ISR	Israel	Middle East and North Africa	High income	Very high HDI
ITA	Italy	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
CIV	Ivory Coast	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
JAM	Jamaica	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	High HDI
JPN	Japan	East Asia and Pacific	High income	Very high HDI
JOR	Jordan	Middle East and North Africa	Upper middle income	High HDI
KAZ	Kazakhstan	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
KEN	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
KWT	Kuwait	Middle East and North Africa	High income	Very high HDI
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	Europe and Central Asia	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
LAO	Laos	East Asia and Pacific	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
LVA	Latvia	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
LBN	Lebanon	Middle East and North Africa	Upper middle income	High HDI
LSO	Lesotho	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Low HDI
LBR	Liberia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
LTU	Lithuania	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
LUX	Luxembourg	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
MDG	Madagascar	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
MWI	Malawi	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
MYS	Malaysia	East Asia and Pacific	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
MLI	Mali	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
MLT	Malta	Middle East and North Africa	High income	Very high HDI
MRT	Mauritania	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
MUS	Mauritius	Sub-Saharan Africa	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
MEX	Mexico	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	High HDI
MDA	Moldavia	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	High HDI
MNG	Mongolia	East Asia and Pacific	Lower middle income	High HDI
MNE	Montenegro	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
MAR	Morocco	Middle East and North Africa	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
MOZ	Mozambique	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
MMR	Myanmar	East Asia and Pacific	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
NAM	Namibia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Upper middle income	Medium HDI
NPL	Nepal	South Asia	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
NLD	Netherlands	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI

ISO3	NAME	REGION WORLD BANK (2022)	INCOME WORLD BANK (2022)	HDI 2021/22
NZL	New Zealand	East Asia and Pacific	High income	Very high HDI
NIC	Nicaragua	Latin America and the Caribbean	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
NER	Niger	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
NGA	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Low HDI
MKD	Northern Macedonia	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	High HDI
NOR	Norway	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
OMN	Oman	Middle East and North Africa	High income	Very high HDI
PAK	Pakistan	South Asia	Lower middle income	Low HDI
PAN	Panama	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
PNG	Papua New Guinea	East Asia and Pacific	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
PRY	Paraguay	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	High HDI
PER	Peru	Latin America and the Caribbean	Upper middle income	High HDI
PHL	Philippines	East Asia and Pacific	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
POL	Poland	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
PRT	Portugal	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
QAT	Qatar	Middle East and North Africa	High income	Very high HDI
ROU	Romania	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
RUS	Russia	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
RWA	Rwanda	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
SAU	Saudi Arabia	Middle East and North Africa	High income	Very high HDI
SEN	Senegal	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Low HDI
SRB	Serbia	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
SLE	Sierra Leone	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
SGP	Singapore	East Asia and Pacific	High income	Very high HDI
SVK	Slovakia	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
SVN	Slovenia	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
ZAF	South Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Upper middle income	High HDI
KOR	South Korea	East Asia and Pacific	High income	Very high HDI
ESP	Spain	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
LKA	Sri Lanka	South Asia	Lower middle income	High HDI
SDN	Sudan	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
SWE	Sweden	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
CHE	Switzerland	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
SYR	Syria	Middle East and North Africa	Low income	Medium HDI

ISO3	NAME	REGION WORLD BANK (2022)	INCOME WORLD BANK (2022)	HDI 2021/22
TZA	Tanzania	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Low HDI
THA	Thailand	East Asia and Pacific	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
TGO	Togo	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago	Latin America and the Caribbean	High income	Very high HDI
TUN	Tunisia	Middle East and North Africa	Lower middle income	High HDI
TUR	Turkey	Europe and Central Asia	Upper middle income	Very high HDI
UGA	Uganda	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income	Low HDI
UKR	Ukraine	Europe and Central Asia	Lower middle income	High HDI
ARE	United Arab Emirates	Middle East and North Africa	High income	Very high HDI
GBR	United Kingdom	Europe and Central Asia	High income	Very high HDI
USA	United States	North America	High income	Very high HDI
URY	Uruguay	Latin America and the Caribbean	High income	Very high HDI
UZB	Uzbekistan	Europe and Central Asia	Lower middle income	High HDI
VEN	Venezuela	Latin America and the Caribbean	Not classified	Medium HDI
VNM	Vietnam	East Asia and Pacific	Lower middle income	High HDI
YEM	Yemen	Middle East and North Africa	Low income	Low HDI
ZMB	Zambia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Medium HDI
ZWE	Zimbabwe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Lower middle income	Medium HDI

Source: own data.

The Coherence Index (Indico) is a tool designed to measure, evaluate and compare countries' commitment to sustainable, fair and equitable human development. We propose an alternative to the limited, hegemonic view of the indicators typically used to measure progress and development, particularly gross domestic product (GDP).

This is the third Coherence Index report, and this new version evaluates the performance of 153 countries.

> *This tool is intended to transform our way of understanding the world and guide the urgent transformations that today's world demands.*

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